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A Matchmaker?s Challenge: Marrying 
International Law and American 
Environmental Law 
DAVID A. \VIRTH$ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is now axiomatic that environmental law is among the most rap-
idly growing, innovative areas of the international legal system. 
Recent compendia identify hundreds of international agreements 
dealing, directly or indirectly, with environmental concerns.1 Multi-
lateral negotiations addressing depletion of the stratospheric ozone 
layer,2 international trade in toxic wastes,3 and the integrity of the 
global climate4 have attracted enormous attention from governments 
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1. See, e.g, Register of International Treaties and Olber Agreements in Ibe Field of Ibe 
Environment, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.16/Inf.4 (1991) (identifying 152 multilateral 
agreements); United States International Trade Commission, International Agreements to 
Protect the Environment and Wildlife (1991) (report to Committee on Finance of United 
States Senate pursuant to section 332 of Tariff Act of 1930) (identifying 170 multilateral and 
bilateral agreements affecting environmental issues). 
2. See, e.g., Cass Peterson, Administration Ozone Policy May Favor Sung1asses, Hats, 
Wash. Post, May 29, 1987, at AI. 
3. See, e.g., Tom Dickson, Prospects for Toxic Waste Treaty Hang in Balance. rID. TlDlC5, 
Feb. 7, 1989, at 2. 
4. See, e.g., Michael Weisskopf, Global Warming Rift Threatens Treaty: U.N. Talks Close 
With Industrialized Nations, Third World At Odds, Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1992, at A3. 
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and the public in the United States and abroad. Resulting legal 
instruments, such as the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That 
Deplete the Ozone LayerS and the 1989 Basel Convention on the Con-
trol of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal,6 have generated considerable optimism about the potential 
for international law effectively to mitigate global environmental 
risks. 
Multilateral discussions now often supplant national statutory and 
regulatory schemes crafted in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the 
preferred fora for federal policy-making on such environmental 
hazards as stratospheric ozone depletion 7 and exports of hazardous 
wastes.8 Tackling international environmental problems like ozone 
destruction and overseas shipment of wastes in a global context has 
obvious benefits. A multilateral setting provides a unique opportunity 
to design effective and efficient international legal structures that 
advance critical environmental goals while simultaneously reflecting 
the needs and expectations of all countries. 
This trend toward multilateral resolution of international environ-
mental questions has generally been lauded.9 Less well appreciated is 
the potential for tension and even clashes between the procedure and 
substance of international and domestic legal frameworks. Considera-
5. Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10, looth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 52 Fed. 
Reg. 47,515 (Dec. 14, 1987); 17 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 256 (1987); 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987), amended 
and adjusted, S. Treaty Doc. No.4, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1 Y.B. Int'l 
Envtl. L. 612 (1990); Int'1 Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3151; 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991) [hereinafter 
Montreal Protocol]. See infra note 30 (discussing contents and negotiating history of Montreal 
Protocol). 
6. Mar. 22, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. No.5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 19 Envtl. 
Pol'y & L. 68 (1989); Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3701; 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) (not in force) 
[hereinafter Basel Convention]. See infra note 15 (discussing contents of Basel Convention). 
The Basel Convention will enter into force on May 5, 1992. 
7. See Clean Air Act § 157, 42 U.S.C. § 7457 (repealed 1990) (directing Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to respond by regulation if there is reason to believe that health and 
environment are endangered by human activities that deplete stratospheric ozone); 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 762; 43 Fed. Reg. 11,318 & 11,301 (1978) (1978 implementing regulations curtailing non· 
essential uses of chlorofluorocarbons). Section 157 was repealed and replaced with a new 
provision tracking the Montreal Protocol's structure and substance. Clean Air Act §§ 601-
618,42 U.S.C. §§ 7671.7671q. 
8. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, § 3017, 42 U.S.C. § 6938 
[hereinafter RCRA]; 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.50-.57 (implementing regulations requiring consent of 
government of country of import prior to foreign shipment of hazardous wastes). See also 40 
C.F.R. pts. 262 & 263 (repealed 1986) (previous regulations requiring notice only). The Basel 
Convention was recently submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. See 
supra note 6. Accompanying implementing legislation, which would supersede the RCRA 
statutory scheme, tracks the structure and substance of the Basel Convention. 
9. See, e.g., Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned In Global Environmental Governance (1990). 
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ble differences exist between the international and national legal 
orders. Many bedrock principles of domestic environmental and 
administrative law-including notice to the public, an opportunity to 
be heard, and judicial review to assure reasoned decision-making-are 
reflected poorly, if at all, in the international legal system. Indeed, the 
notion that any of these components might be essential to the integ-
rity of international legal processes, including international environ-
mental decision-making, borders on heresy. In extreme cases, 
decisions that could directly affect the health and well-being of people 
within the United States could be lifted out of domestic decision-mak-
ing processes and placed in a legal context that barely acknowledges 
the existence of individuals. In other circumstances, the power of an 
individual state to take measures to preserve natural resources 'within 
its own jurisdiction or shared resources of the global commons may 
be constrained. 
The relationship between the international and domestic law of the 
environment, moreover, is a microcosm for exploring considerably 
larger questions of separation of powers, the role of foreign relations 
in domestic law, the accountability of public processes, and the role of 
the public in establishing governmental policy on the national and 
international levels. Indeed, the potential legal costs accompanying 
these shifts from the national to the international arena in environ-
mental law-making cut to the very core of the constitutional structure 
of our government and the nature of our representative democracy. 
In exploring this relatively uncharted area of the law, this Article 
evaluates the relationship between international agreements and 
domestic public law in the context of environmental decision-making. 
First, relevant procedural and substantive doctrines of international 
and domestic law are examined to clarify the nature of the interac-
tions between the two legal systems. Then, several case studies of 
serious discontinuities between international developments and 
domestic public law are analyzed. Finally, after the examination of 
these generic doctrines and concrete examples, recommendations are 
made for narrowing these divergences and encouraging smoother 
relationships between the international and national legal regimes. 
IT. Two LARGELY INDEPENDENT LEGAL SYSTEMS 
The simultaneous treatment of issues on the international and 
domestic levels, and the necessity for domestic implementation of 
commitments assumed on the international level, engages both legal 
systems. While the juncture between the two can be smooth, interac-
tions on occasion are uneasy. Instances in which one legal system 
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does not fully reflect developments in the other can create significant 
discontinuities in both procedure and substance. 
A. Trends in International Environmental Law 
Legal obligations in the international environmental field arise prin-
cipally through international agreements,10 among which the "legisla-
tive" instruments of binding multilateral agreements have assumed 
principal importance. II The development of customary international 
law through the accretion of widespread practice by states, a second 
mechanism resulting in obligatory duties on the international level, 
has been considerably less important in defining international envi-
ronmentallaw. 12 
10. For the sake of precision, the generic term "international agreement" as used in this 
Article encompasses all instruments binding under international law. The term "treaty" is 
limited to those international agreements for which the Senate's advice and consent to 
ratification is necessary or has been given under U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. See Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 301 & 303 cmt. a (1987) 
[hereinafter Restatement]. cr. infra note 48 (identifying and contrasting executive 
agreements). 
11. See generally Sand, supra note 9; Developments in the Law-International 
Environmental Law, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1484, 1521-50 (1991) [hereinafter Developments in the 
Law]. See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Promulgation of International Norms in the 
UN System by Nontraditional Methods, in The United Nations in the International Legal 
Order (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds. 1992) (in press) (discussing international 
"legislative" mechanisms other than multilateral treaty negotiations). 
12. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1521. The development of 
customary norms is generally slower than multilateral "legislative" mechanisms, the resulting 
standards are not necessarily precisely crafted to respond to the underlying problem, and 
customary legal principles ordinarily respond sluggishly if at all to new scientific evidence. For 
example, in the famous Trail Smelter case between the United States and Canada, an 
international arbitral tribunal articulated the following rule of customary international law: 
[U]nder the principles of international law ... no state has the right to use or permit 
the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the 
territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious 
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 
Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1938-41). This principle has also 
been increasingly widely accepted as a statement of customary international law generally 
applicable to case of pollution, including media other than air. See, e.g., 2 Restatement, supra 
note 10, § 601 reporters' note 1; International Law Association, Report of the Sixtieth Confer-
ence Held at Montrea1161, 165 (1983) (resolution concerning legal aspects of the conservation 
of the environment); Gunther Handl, International Liability of States for Marine Pollution, 21 
Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 85,90 n.25 (1983). However, given the posture of the international arbitra-
tion, the legal force of this principle is not entirely without question. See, e.g., Frederic L. 
Kirgis, Jr., Technological Challenge to the Shared Environment: United States Practice, 66 
Am. J. Int'I L. 290, 293 (1972) (noting that "Canada did not actively contest its responsibility 
for the conduct of the smelter"). Moreover, despite its extensive endorsement and the lip 
service paid to it, this standard is probably more often honored in the breach than in the 
observance, particularly in the area of air pollution. Otherwise, all that would be necessary to 
breathe clean air would be to walk to a national border. 
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Multilateral agreements in the environmental area increasingly 
articulate specific and often complex regulatory schemes 'with measur-
able, crisp procedural and substantive requirements for implementa-
tion by individual states. These multilateral instruments are 
analogous in many ways to domestic regulatory structures in their 
precision. For example, the 1985 Helsinki Protocol on Reduction of 
Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least Thirty 
Per Cent13 requires each state party to accomplish a uniform percent-
age cutback in pollution, measured from an agreed base year, by a 
firm deadline. The 1988 Sofia Protocol Concerning the Control of 
Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxesl4 sets 
out highly specific technology-based standards for pollution control. 
The 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their DisposallS mandates detailed 
procedures governing the export of municipal trash and toxic detritus. 
The subjects of these agreements, such as acid rain 16 and international 
traffic in hazardous wastes,17 often overlap with domestic statutory 
requirements. 
Although the products of these multilateral undertakings may bear 
considerable resemblance to domestic environmental statutes or regu-
lations, the processes by which these multilateral instruments are for-
mulated do not. Because until relatively recently only states were 
considered subjects of international law, 18 multilateral bodies are pri-
13. July 8, 1985, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3021; 27 I.L.M. 698 (1988). 
14. Oct. 31, 1988, 18 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 228 (1988); Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3041; 28 
I.L.M. 212 (1989) [hereinafter NO. Protocol]. 
15. See supra note 6. The Basel Convention prohibits exports and imports of hazardous and 
other wastes by parties to the Convention to and from nonparty states. Second, the 
Convention bans shipments of hazardous and other wastes to p3J1ies that have prohibited 
imports. Third, the Convention establishes a prior informed consent procedure for parties that 
have not prohibited waste imports. In advance of shipment, the country of export notifies the 
receiving state, which then has an opportunity to reject the shipment simply by dcclining to 
receive it. Fourth, the Basel Convention requires that states of export prohibit shipments of 
hazardous and other wastes if there is reason to believe that the wastes will not be managed in 
an environmentally sound manner in the country of import. Last, the Convention articulates 
an obligation for states of export to ensure that international shipments of wastes are accepted 
for re-import if those shipments do not conform to the terms of export. 
16. See Clean Air Act §§ 401-416, 42 U.S.c. §§ 7651-76510 (acid rain provisions added by 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990). 
17. See RCRA § 3017, 42 U.S.c. § 6938; 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.50-.57 (implementing 
regulations requiring consent of government of country of import prior to foreign shipments of 
hazardous wastes). 
18. See, e.g., Phillippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community, and International Law, 30 
Harv. Int'l L.J. 393, 396-401 (1989) (arguing for a greater role for non-state actors in 
international law). See generally T.R. Subramanya, Rights and Status of the Individual in 
International Law (1984). 
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marily organizations of states represented by their governments. 19 
Presumably because they are principally, if not exclusively, fora for 
intergovernmental negotiations, many multilateral processes typically 
lack the openness and public accountability accepted as a matter of 
course in domestic legislative and administrative processes of the 
United States.20 Public scrutiny of and access to international 
processes may be difficult or even non-existent. Although some scien-
tists, businesspeople, and non-governmental organizations have man-
aged to carve out niches for themselves as observers or advisers to 
multilateral institutions, policy and practice among international 
organizations regarding public participation remains very uneven and 
has not been standardized.21 Although some documents may circu-
19. See generally Derek W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions (4th ed. 1982). 
One notable exception is the International Labor Organization (lLO), in which members of the 
pUblic-in that case workers' and employers' organizations-are voting delegates to the 
annual International Labor Conference. The ILO's "tripartite" structure assures that non· 
governmental representatives at the Conference, which is the ILO's plenary body that adopts 
binding multilateral conventions, are equal to governmental delegates in total numbers. See 
Constitution of the International Labor Organization, arts. 3 & 4, 62 Stat. 3485, T.I.A.S. No. 
1868, 15 U.N.T.S., amended, June 25, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 245, T.I.A.S. No. 3500, 191 U.N.T.S. 
143, amended, June 22,1962, 14 U.S.T. 1039, T.I.A.S. No. 5401,466 U.N.T.S. 323, amended, 
June 22, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3253, T.I.A.S. No. 7987. Even in the ILO, however, rights of 
participation by non-governmental entities are collective, not individual. 
20. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act,S U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701·706 [hereinafter 
APA]; Freedom of Information Act,S U.S.C. § 552 [hereinafter FOIA]; Government in the 
Sunshine Act,S U.S.C. § 552b; Federal Advisory Committee Act,S U.S.C. app. I. Cf. 
Directive on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment, 33 O.J. Eur. Comm. 
(No. L 158) 56 (1990) Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 131:7001 (establishing guidelines for free access 
to publicly held information relating to the environment). 
21. The United Nations (UN) Charter explicitly addresses participation by private entities, 
including so-called "non-governmental organizations" (NGOs), as observers in the work of the 
Organization. U.N. Charter art. 71 ("The Economic and Social Council may make suitable 
arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with 
matters within its competence."). Signed June 26, 1945, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 933, 3 Bevans 1153 (1969). The UN's Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) has established a formal system for interacting with NGOs awarded consultative 
status with that body. See E.S.C. Res. 1296,44 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.1) at 21, U.N. Doc. 
E/4548 (1968). 
Category I organizations 
are concerned with most of the activities of the Council and can demonstrate to the 
satisfaction of the Council that they have marked and sustained contributions to 
make to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations [with respect to 
international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, scientific, technological 
and related matters and to questions of human rights], and are closely involv~d with 
the economic and social life of the peoples of the areas they represent and whose 
membership, which should be considerable, is broadly representative of major 
segments of population in a large number of countries. 
Id. 11 16. 
Category II organizations also operate on the international level, but have special compe· 
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late informally, distribution of proposals for and drafts of multilateral 
agreements and other important instruments may also be confined to 
governments.22 
tence in competence or interest in only some of ECOSOC's activities. ECOSOC nlso maintains 
a "Roster" of other organizations that "can make occasional and useful contributions to the 
work of the Council or its subsidiary bodies or other United Nations bodies \vithin their com-
petence." lei. 1\19. As of early 1992, forty-one and 352 NGOs had been granted Category I 
and Category n consultative status, respectively, and an additional 223 were included on the 
"Roster." Depending on their classification, NGOs with consultative status may be entitled to 
send representatives to meetings, to submit written statements to the Council, to make oml 
statements at meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies, and to request inclusion of 
items on the Council's provisional agenda. See generally R. Sybesma-KnoJ, The Status of 
Observers in the United Nations 295-318 (1981). Specialized agencies and other organs in the 
UN system also have their own approaches to participation by non-governmentnl observers. 
For example, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has routinely accredited 
non-governmental observers to multilateral negotiations. See, e.g., Peter Sand, Protecting the 
Ozone Layer: The Vienna Convention is Adopted, 27 Env't, June 1985, at 19,42 (wortation 
to NGOs by Chief of Environmental Law Unit and Deputy Director of Environmentnl Man-
agement Service ofUNEP to participate in drafting and enforcement pl"OCeSSeS for framework 
convention on protection of stratospheric ozone layer). The Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, Mar. 3, 1973, art. XI(7), 27 U.S.T. 
1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243; reprinted in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:2101; 12 
I.L.M. 1035 (1973), specifically provides for participation by non-voting observers in meetings 
of the parties to that agreement. 
By contrast, industry and trade unions have institutionalized advisory roles in the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), but there is no similar formal 
opportunity for involvement of representatives of public interest environmentnl organizations 
in their own right. NGOs are not customarily admitted as observers to meetings held under 
the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See Rules of Procedure 
for Sessions of the Contracting Parties, rules 8 & 9. reprinted in General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 10 (12th Supp. 1964) Oimiting observ-
ers to governments and intergovernmentnl organizations) [hereinafter BISD). Substantive 
international law in particular areas may also create entry points to assure some accountability 
to the public. For instance, the widely accepted methodology of environmentnl impact assess-
ment-the international analog of the National Environmentnl Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.c. 
§§ 4321-4370 (1988)-includes public participation as a component of a larger framework 
designed to assure the soundness of decision-making pl"OCeSSeS that may have adverse environ-
mental impacts. See generally David A. Wirth, Intemationlll Technology Transfer and En .. i-
ronmental Impact Assessment, in Transferring Hazardous Technologies and Substances: The 
International Legal Challenge 83 (Giinther Handl & Robert Lutz ed. 1989). Pri\'3te sector 
representatives may be included on official United States delegations to multilateral confer-
ences, in which case, however, they are representatives of the government and may be bound 
by governmental instructions. See generally John McDonllld. How to Be a Delegate (1984). 
Other formal and informal channels for input at the national level may also exist. See., e.S., 
Trade Act of 1974 § 135, 19 U.S.c. § 2155 (1988) (directing trade negotiators to consult .... ith 
private sector representatives and establishing Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and 
Negotiations). 
22. See, e.g., World Bank, Directive on Disclosure of Information (1989) (establishing 
exclusive list of releasable documents and categorically excluding key documents, such as 
president's reports and memoranda, supervision reports, and project completion reports, from 
release regardless of information contained therein); John H. Jackson. World Trade and 
the Law of GATT 901-12 (1969) (reviewing documentation policies of GATT and noting 
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Measures taken to arrest the depletion of the stratospheric ozone 
layer3 illustrate the major differences between the international legal 
order and the domestic law of the environment. The Clean Air Act24 
formerly directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
respond by regulation if there was reason to believe that human activi-
ties damaging the ozone layer might endanger health and environ-
ment. Acting pursuant to this mandate and in response to 
considerable public concern, in 1978 EPA, through a notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking proceeding,2S prohibited nonessential uses of ozone-
destroying chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) such as spray aerosol 
propellants.26 
In the mid-1980s it became apparent that this limited ban on a 
small number of CFC uses was insufficient to address grave threats to 
the integrity of the stratospheric ozone layer, which by then was seri-
ously disrupted by a continent-sized "hole" over Antarctica.27 After 
being prodded with a lawsuit,28 the Executive Branch took up the 
issue again, but this time in a multilateral arena, the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP).29 The resulting Montreal Protocol 
that "[m]uch of the documentation, when issued, is 'restricted' to government officials"). 
For example, the Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations in GATT is classified as "restricted." See G.A.T.T. Doc. 
MTN.TNC/W /FA (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Draft Final Act]. See infra notes 101 & 102 
(discussing Uruguay Round). 
23. For a discussion of the causes 'and effects of stratospheric ozone depletion, see generally 
National Research Council, Ozone Depletion, Greenhouse Gases, and Climate Change (1989); 
United States Environmental Protection Agency & United Nations Environment Programme, 
3 Effects of Changes in Stratospheric Ozone and Global Climate: Climate Change (1986); 
United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Ozone Trends Panel Report 
(1988) (consensus findings of panel of more than 100 scientists). 
24. Clean Air Act § 157, 42 U.S.C. § 7457 (repealed 1990). Section 157 was repealed and 
replaced with a new and considerably more detailed statutory directive tracking the Montreal 
Protocol. Clean Air Act §§ 601-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q. 
25. See Clean Air Act § 307(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (rulemaking). Cf. Administrative 
Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
26. 40 C.F.R. pt. 762. A number of other countries, including Canada and the Nordic 
nations, enacted similar controls on nonessential aerosol uses of CFCs. By contrast, the 
European Community (EC) established a limit, considerably above then-existing levels, on 
total CFC production. See Thomas Stoel, Alan S. Miller & Breck Milroy, Fluorocarbon 
Regulation: An International Comparison (1980). 
27. See, e.g., J.C. Farman, B.G. Gardiner & J.D. Shanklin, Large Losses of Total Ozone in 
Antarctica Reveal Season CIO.INO. Interaction, 315 Nature 207 (1985) (report of British 
Antarctic Survey Team). Cf. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,726 (1980) (advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking discussing possibility of production controls beyond 1978 aerosol ban). 
28. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas, Civ. No. 84-3587 (D.D.C. May 17, 
1986) (consent decree establishing schedule for regulatory action on CFCs). 
29. Negotiations had been proceeding since the early 1980s on a "framework" multilateral 
convention establishing an institutional basis for global cooperation and an ancillary 
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on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,30 which sets out a pre-
cise numerical reduction schedule for chemicals that may deplete the 
ozone layer with firm deadlines, is now widely regarded as an effec-
tive, potentially global solution to the problem of ozone depletion. 
Substantial differences in process accompanied this transition to an 
international forum for crafting legal requirements for reductions in 
emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals. EPA implemented the Pro-
tocol through a domestic rulemaking,31 much as it had the 1978 spray 
propellant ban. The new regulatory proceeding, however, was signifi-
cantly different from, and much more constrained than, the earlier 
one. This time many important issues in the rulemaking had already 
been decided in the multilateral negotiations sponsored by UNEP. As 
agreement, known as a "protocol," containing regulatory measures for CFCs. When 
negotiations on the CFC protocol broke down, the framework agreement alone was ndopted. 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11,097, reprinted in 14 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 72 (1985); Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3101; 26 
LL.M. 1516 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. See 132 Cong. Rcc. 59615 (daily ed. Jul. 
24, 1986) (resolution of advice and consent to ratification). The Vienna Convention itself 
contains no substantive requirements for controlling emissions of ozone-depleting chemicnls. 
Instead, it embodies only a vague exhortation to protect the stratospheric ozone layer through 
the implementation of "appropriate measures." Id. art. 2(1). Negotiations on the protocol, 
which resumed in 1986 after a scheduled one-year "cooling off" period. coincided with an 
upsurge in public concern about the Antarctic ozone hole, which broke the deadlock and 
facilitated adoption of the Montreal Protocol in September 1987. See infra note 30. For the 
history, structure, and functioning of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). see 
generally Lynton K. Caldwell, International Environmental Policy 71-83 (2d ed. 1990); Mark 
A. Gray, The United Nations Environment Programme: An Assessment, 20 EnvtL L. 291 
(1990). • 
30. See supra note 5. The Montreal Protocol. adopted in September 1987. requires an 
incremental fifty per cent reduction in the consumption of five ozone-depleting CFCs by the 
end of this centurY. Through 1991, the Montreal Protocol was in force for over seventy 
countries, including the United States. The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification 
on March 14, 1988, see 134 Cong. Rec. S2109 (dailyed. 1988). and the United States ratified 
the Protocol on April 21, 1988. Revisions to the Protocol. which are not yet in force, require a 
total phase-out by industrialized countries in consumption of CFCs and other related 
compounds, including a class of chemicals known as hnlons, before the end of the century. 
For a history of the negotiations leading to the Montreal Protocol and its 1990 revisions, see 
generally Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 
(1991); Sharon Roan, Ozone Crisis: The IS-Year Evolution of a Sudden Glob:1l Emergency 
(1989); Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal 
Protocol, 16 Yale J. Int'l L. 519 (1991); Jamison Koehler & Scott A. Rajost, The Montreal 
Protocol: A Dynamic Agreement for Protecting the Ozone Layer, 19 Ambio 82 (1990); Peter 
M. Morrisette, The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion. 29 Nat. 
Resources J. 793 (1989); Dale S. Bryk, The Montreal Protocol and Recent Developments to 
Protect the Ozone Layer, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 275 (1991); Annette Capretta. Note, The 
Future's So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades: Future Impacts of the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 29 Va. J. Int'l L. 211 (1988); H. Christian Sorensen. 
Recent Developments, 29 Harv. Int'l LJ. 185 (1988). 
31. 40 C.F.R. pt. 82. 
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the principal mechanism for domestic policy-making, that interna-
tional process did not afford the same procedural guarantees as a 
domestic rulemaking.32 As a substantive matter, moreover, EPA 
interpreted the Montreal Protocol as both a floor and a ceiling. The 
international commitments in the Protocol precluded weaker regula-
tion of the eight enumerated ozone-depleting chemicals, and strategic 
and prudential considerations inherent in international bargaining 
counseled against more stringent controls.33 
32. EPA announced the status of the negotiations through narrative descriptions and 
provided an opportunity for public comment on certain issues. See, e.g., 52 Fed. Reg. 29,110 
(1987) (notice concerning preparation of environmental impact statement and other issues); 51 
Fed. Reg. 40,510 (1986) (notice of availability of risk assessment); 51 Fed. Reg. 21,576 (1986) 
(notice of workshop and conference); 51 Fed. Reg. 5091 (1986) (same); 51 Fed. Reg. 1257 
(1986) (announcement of program plan). Interim drafts of the Protocol also circulated 
informally. EPA did not, however, formally publish these interim drafts of the Montreal 
Protocol. The text of Montreal Protocol appeared in the Federal Register for the first time 
only in final form in EPA's notice of proposed rulemaking to implement the international 
instrument domestically. 52 Fed. Reg. 47,489, 47,515 (1987). 
33. In responding to the argument of some commentators that the Clean Air Act contained 
more demanding requirements for the regulation of ozone-depleting chemicals than the 
Montreal Protocol, the Agency made the following assertion: 
EPA ... believes that in deciding whether and how to regulate under section 
157(b) it may consider other countries' effect on stratospheric ozone and the effect of 
United States action on other countries' willingness to take regulatory action. There 
is no dispute that the cause and effects of ozone depletion are global in nature. 
Ozone-depleting emissions from all nations mix in the atmosphere and threaten the 
stratosphere above every nation. Thus, in order to assess the risk of ozone depletion 
and the need for regulatory action, EPA must consider other nations' actions 
affecting the stratosphere. A logical next step in this analysis is what effect United 
States action could have on other nations' actions now and in the future .... 
. . . EPA judged that the obvious need for broad international adherence to the 
Protocol counseled against the United States' deviating from the Protocol, because 
any significant deviation could lessen other countries' motivation to participate. To 
the extent the Protocol's existing control requirements were later found more or less 
stringent than necessary to protect stratospheric ozone, EPA noted that key 
provisions in the agreement afford the Parties the opportunity to review and revise 
those requirements .... Industry commenters also generally agreed with EPA's 
concern that deviating from the Protocol risked undermining it. They recognized 
that implementation of less stringent controls than the Protocol required would be 
unacceptable, and shared EPA's concern that implementation of more stringent 
controls would yield little, if any, additional stratospheric protection, while possibly 
reducing other countries' incentive to join the Protocol. 
53 Fed. Reg. 30,566, 30,569, 30,573-74 (1988) (final regulation implementing Montreal Proto-
col). This position of the Executive Branch has now been reversed by the Congress, which has 
enacted legislation regulating ozone-depleting chemicals more stringently than the Montreal 
Protocol by requiring the following: (1) a larger number of intermediate reduction steps; (2) a 
phase-out in some alternatives to substances controlled in the Montreal Protocol; (3) the intro-
duction of a recycling program; and (4) an additional requirement, not found in the Montreal 
Protocol, specifying that substitutes for substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol must 
be environmentally benign. Clean Air Act §§ 601-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q. 
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B. The Domestic Law of Foreign Relations 
An international agreement, including an environmental pact, is 
both binding under international law34 and, like a statute, "the 
supreme Law of the Land. "35 Customary international law is likewise 
"part of our law."36 Although the responsibilities of the United States 
remain intact on the international plane, a number of doctrines may 
nonetheless vitiate the force of international legal requirements within 
the United States. Congress may enact legislation that supersedes 
commitments in an international agreement or that violates custom-
ary international law.37 The courts may invalidate international 
agreements on domestic legal grounds.38 As a matter of domestic law, 
the Executive Branch may take actions inconsistent with customary 
international legal standards.39 
At least one supplementary principle operates to ameliorate discon-
34. See Restatement, supra note 10, § 301; 22 C.F.R. pt. 181 (State Depmment regulations 
establishing standards for identifying international agreement); 11 F.A.M. pt. 700, reprinted in 
1 Michael J. Glennon & Thomas M. Franck, United States Foreign Relations Law: 
Documents and Sources 203 (1980) (same) [hereinafter Glennon & Franck]; 76 State 1394 
(Mar. 9, 1976), reprinted in 1 Glennon & Franck, supra, at 14 (same); Memorandum of 
American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, Libraxy of Congress (Mar. 17, 
1978), reprinted in 1 Glennon & Franck, supra, at 6 (defining international agreement). 
35. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the 
Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of 
legislation."); Restatement, supra note 10, § Ill; Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the 
Constitution 163-64 (1972). 
36. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900). See Restatement, supra note 10, § Ill; 
Henkin, supra note 35, at 221-24. cr. supra note 12 (discussing customary international law of 
environment). 
37. See Restatement, supra note 10, § 115(2), cmt. c & reporters' note 1; Henkin, supra note 
35, at 163-64. 
38. See, e.g., United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on 
other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) (mvalidating executive agreement as inconsistent with 
statute); Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1983) (same); Restatement. 
supra note 10, § 115 reporters' note 5; Henkin, supra note 35, at 184-87. Although possible as 
a matter of principle, the number of instances in which courts have invalidated international 
agreements is very small. 
39. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom 
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 479 U.S. 889 (1986) (upholding action of Attorney General 
authorizing detention of aliens in violation of international law); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 
622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (same). But see Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 
F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (affirming grant of petition of habeas corpus for detention of alien 
in violation of international law). See generally Henkin, supra note 35, at 221-22; Louis 
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion 
and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 864 (1987) (noting that dictum in Garcia-Mir could be 
read to support an "assertion that .•. the President and lesser executive officials may disregard 
a treaty or a rule of international law"); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., May the President Violate 
Customary International Law? (Cont'd), 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 371 (1987); Jonathan I. Charney, 
May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 80 Am. 1. Int'l L. 913 (1986). 
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tinuities that might otherwise be created by these doctrines. When it 
is possible to reconcile a statute and international law, whether 
originating in agreement or custom, domestic law is construed so as 
not to conflict with the international duty.40 Congress is thus pre-
sumed to act consistently with international law and the international 
legal responsibilities of the United States.41 
Although an international agreement and Congressional legislation 
are of equal legal authority, the formulation of international commit-
ments differs considerably from domestic statutory enactments. The 
President, as the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations,"42 
has the exclusive power to "make Treaties"43-in effect, simultane-
ously to define both the national law and the international legal obli-
gations of the United States. The Constitution requires the advice 
and consent of the Senate, by a two-thirds majority, to ratification of 
concluded international agreements.44 The President negotiates the 
treaty for the United States and then presents it as a concluded agree-
ment to the Senate for its post hoc advice and consent to subsequent 
ratification.45 Besides determining the content of the agreement in the 
first instance, the President's agreement to a prohibition on reserva-
tions in the agreement may further dilute Congressional input into the 
ratification of a multilateral treaty.46 Even if the Senate can attach 
40. See Murray v. The Schooner Channing Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("an 
Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains"); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 539-40 (1884) 
(interpreting statute to avoid conflict with earlier treaty); United States v. Palestine Liberation 
Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1468-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same); 1 Restatement, supra note 
10, § 114 & reporters' note 1 (citing additional cases construing statutes to avoid conflict with 
earlier treaty provisions); Henkin, supra note 35, at 163-64. 
41. Additionally, the rule probably also reflects the courts' deference to the political 
branches in foreign affairs. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign 
Relations, in Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 98 (Louis Henkin, Michael J. Glennon 
& William D. Rogers ed. 1990); Thomas M. Franck, Courts and Foreign Policy, Foreign 
Pol'y, Summer 1991, at 66. 
42. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). See Henkin, 
supra note 35, at 45-50. 
43. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. See generally Henkin, supra note 35, at 130-36. 
44. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. For article II, section 2 treaties, the President enters into 
international commitments provisionally, conditional upon subsequent ratification after Senate 
advice and consent. See Restatement, supra note 10, § 303 cmt. d; Henkin, supra note 35, at 
133-36. 
45. There may nonetheless be a great deal of interaction between the legislature and the 
Executive Branch during negotiations. For instance, in the stratospheric ozone example, there 
were a number of Congressional hearings, resolutions, and bills introduced designed to 
influence the progress of the negotiations. See generally Benedick, supra note 30; Roan, supra 
note 30. 
46. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, art. 18 (no reservations permitted); Basel 
Convention, supra note 6, art. 26 (same). 
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reservations, those qualifications may not have much effect in the con-
text of a multilateral treaty if other treaty partners object to them.47 
The Executive Branch also enters into a distinct and very large cat-
egory of "executive agreements,,48 on behalf of the United States that, 
unlike treaties concluded under article II, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion, do not require subsequent Congressional endorsement. 49 A sub-
set of executive agreements, so-called "sole" agreements undertaken 
by the President in reliance on his own constitutional authority,so 
does not require legislative participation either as a precondition to 
negotiation or subsequent to conclusion. As a matter of practice, the 
Executive Branch also enters into some executive agreements that rely 
on existing statutory authority but are neither expressly authorized by 
statute nor approved by the Congress after the fact.51 In contrast to a 
47. The Senate ordinarily has wide discretion to give or withhold its consent to ratification 
subject to conditions or reservations. See Restatement, supra note 10, § 303 emt. d; Henkin 
supra note 35, at 133-36. For the effect of reservations to a multilateral agreement as a matter 
of international law, see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, arts. 19-23, 
S. Exec. Doc. L, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 63 Am. J. Int') L. 875 (1969), 8 
I.L.M. 679 (1969). This instrument, although not in force for the United States, has been 
accepted by the Executive Branch as a codification of customary international law regarding 
international agreements. See S. Exec. Doc. L, supra, at 1; Restatement, supra note 10, pt. III, 
introductory note. 
48. See supra note 10. So-called "executive agreements," entered into by the President 
without the necessity for Senate advice and consent, may have as their authority one or more 
of the following: (1) Congressional legislation; (2) an article II, section 2 treaty; or (3) the 
President's own constitutional powers. See Restatement, supra note 10, § 303 (1987); 11 
F.A.M. § 721.2; Henkin, supra note 35, at 173-87. See, e.g., Resource Consen'ation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, § 3017(f), 42 U.S.c. § 6938(f) (authorizing bilateral executive 
agreements on export of hazardous wastes waiving otherwise applicable statutory provisions 
for notice and prior consent to government of country of export); Agreement Concerning the 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, Oct. 28, 1986, United States-Canada, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11,099, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 593 (1987) (waiving necessity for notice and prior consent). 
49. Between 1949 and 1990, 683 international agreements were concluded as treaties in the 
constitutional sense. By contrast, during the same period 12,122 executive agreements-
nearly eighteen times as many instruments-were entered into. Treaty Affairs Staff, Office of 
the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements 
Concluded During the Year (1991). 
50. See Restatement, supra note 10, § 303(4) cmt. g; Henkin, supra note 35, at 176-84. 
Among the President's plenary powers that may support a "sole" executive agreement are his 
role as commander-in-chief, U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. I, his prerogative to appoint 
ambassadors, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, his mandate to receive ambassadors, id. art. II, § 3, his 
responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," id., and the vesting of the 
executive power in him, id., art II, § 2, cl. 1. 
51. See, e.g., infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text (discussing multilateral executive 
agreements on air pollution). According to State Department policy, a choice between 
concluding an international agreement as, on the one hand, a treaty in the Constitutional sense 
and, on the other, an executive agreement is determined by consideration of the following eight 
factors: 
(1) the extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting the 
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treaty in the constitutional sense, which has the same legal force as a 
statute, the domestic legal effect of an executive agreement not 
expressly authorized by statute or treaty and concluded without Con-
gressional participation can be somewhat cloudy. 52 
The implementation of international obligations can also differ 
from domestic law-making activities. Treaties that are not "self-exe-
cuting" may require, in addition to Senate advice and consent to rati-
fication, the adoption of implementing legislation to effectuate their 
purposes as a matter of domestic law.53 International negotiations or 
the implementation of actions taken on the international level, such as 
the stratospheric ozone example, may also involve subjects governed 
by domestic administrative law. In these cases, section 4(a)(1) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (AP A), which exempts "a military or 
foreign affairs function of the United States" from notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking, may apply. S4 
nation as a whole; (2) whether the agreement is intended to affect State laws; (3) 
whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of subsequent 
legislation by the Congress; (4) past United States practice as to similar agreements; 
(5) the preference of the Congress as to a particular type of agreement; (6) the degree 
of formality desired for an agreement; (7) the proposed duration of the agreement, 
the need for prompt conclusion of an agreement, and the desirability of concluding a 
routine or short-term agreement; and (8) the general international practice as to 
similar agreements. 
11 F.A.M. § 721.3, reprinted in 1 Glennon & Franck, supra note 34, at 205. State Department 
policy also counsels "the utmost care ... to avoid any invasion or compromise of the constitu-
tional powers of the Senate, the Congress as a whole, or the President." Id. Cf., Case-
Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (instructing Secretary of State to "transmit to the Congress the 
text of any international agreement ... , other than a treaty, to which the United States is a 
party" after conclusion). 
52. See supra note 38. 
53. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1828); Comm. of United States 
Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Restatement, supra 
note 10, § Ill, cmt. h. & reporters' note 5; Henkin, supra note 35, at 156-62. In these 
instances, the implementing legislation, and not the treaty, is given effect as domestic law. 
Whether an international agreement creates a cause of action for private parties is a related but 
distinct question. See Restatement, supra note 10, § III cmt. h. This issue is analogous to the 
existence of express or implied private rights of action under a regulatory statute. See 
generally William H. Timbers & David A. Wirth, Private Rights of Action and Judicial 
Review in Federal Environmental Law, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 403 (1985). 
54. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(I). More than 130 states incorporate section 553 by reference. 
William D. Araiza, Note, Notice-and-Comment Rights for Administrative Decisions Affecting 
International Trade: Heightened Need, No Response, 99 Yale L.J. 669, 681 (1989). That a 
matter that would otherwise be covered by section 553 is taken up in an international forum 
does not necessarily mean that the exception applies. The exemption "is not to be loosely 
interpreted to mean any function extending beyond the borders of the United States, but only 
those 'affairs' which so affect relations with other Governments, that, for example, public 
rulemaking provisions would clearly provoke definitely undesirable international 
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Lastly, questions of justiciability may mean that some legal issues 
evade adjudication or judicial enforcement. The "political question" 
doctrine, which precludes judicial review of certain actions of the 
political branches, has particular vitality in the area of foreign rela-
tions.55 In practice, given the preeminence of the President in matters 
of foreign relations, 56 application of the doctrine often implies defer-
ence to the Executive Branch. 
consequences." S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946). Rclinnce on the exception has 
received judicial approval in a number of contexts, most notnbly international trade. See Am. 
Ass'n of Exporters and Importers-Textile and Apparel Group v. United Stntes, 751 F.2d 
1239 (Fed. eir. 1985) (regulations relating to textile imports pursuant to Multifiber 
Agreement): Mast Industries v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd on 
other grounds, 822 F.2d 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (same). The inquiry in a particular case turns 
on whether the action clearly and directly involves a foreign affairs function of the United 
States and whether failure to grant the exception would provoke undesirable international 
consequences. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 
472 U.S. 846 (1985) (concluding that exception inapplicable in immigration case): Hou Ching 
Chow v. Attorney Gen., 362 F. Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1973) (same). 
55. The leading case on the political question doctrine is Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962), in which the Court stated 
Not only does resolution of [questions touching foreign relations] frequently tum on 
standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion 
demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature; but many such questions 
uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views. Yet it is error 
to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond 
judicial cognizance. 
Id. at 211-212. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (powell, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing that political question doctrine "incorporates three inquiries: (i) Doe; the issue 
involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate 
branch of Government? (n) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move 
beyond areas of judicial expertise? (ill) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial 
intervention?"). But see Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) 
(declining to apply political question doctrine to questions of stntutory interpretntion invohing 
foreign relations concerns). See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text (discussing of Japan 
Whaling). There has been widespread concern over uneven application of the doctrine. See 
generally Henkin, supra note 35, at 210-16: Martin H. Redish, The Federal Courts in the 
Political Order: Judicial Jurisdiction and American Political Theory (1991): Linda Champlin 
& Alan Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 
Hofstra L. Rev. 215 (1985): Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question 
Doctrine, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 814 (1989): Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political 
Question Doctrine, in Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution, supra note 41, at 107; Louis 
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale LJ. 597 (1976); Harold Hongju 
Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Con-
tra Affair, 97 Yale LJ. 1255, 1305-17 (1988); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the 
"Political Question." 79 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1031, 1059-60 (1985). 
56. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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III. DISCONTINUITIES BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 
The international legal system, like national law, is constantly 
changing. International responsibilities of the United States may be 
affected by orders and judgments of the International Court of Jus-
tice,57 decisions of international arbitral tribunals, binding interna-
tional agreements, the evolution of customary standards and norms, 
and other multilateral instruments. 58 Difficulties can nevertheless 
57. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 
No. 993; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States), 1986I.C.J. 14, 149 (order and judgment concluding that support 
of military actions by Nicaraguan "contras" violated international obligations of United States 
arising from both customary law and international agreement). 
58. A significant number of multilateral undertakings in the environmental area have 
resulted in non-binding, hortatory, "soft" instruments. E.g., London Guidelines for the 
Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade, U.N. Doc UNEP/wG.155/ 
L.l Annex I (1987), adopted G.C. Dec. 14/27, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) at 79, U.N. 
Doc. A/42/25 (1987), amended, U.N. Doc. UNEP/PIC/wG.2/4 app. (1989), adopted as 
amended G.C. Dec. 15/30,44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) at 156, U.N. Doc. A/44/25 (1989), 
reprinted in 19 Envt!. Pol'y & L. 125 (1989); Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact 
Assessment, U.N. Doc. UNEP/wG.152/4 Annex (1987), adopted G.C. Dec. 14/25 (1987),42 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) at 77, U.N. Doc. A/42/25 (1987), reprinted in 17 Envtl. Pol'y & 
L. 36 (1987); Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment Against 
Pollution from Land-Based Sources, U.N. Doc. UNEP/wG.120/3 Annex (1985), noted, G.C. 
Dec. 13/18,40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) at 51, U.N. Doc. A/4O/25 (1985), reprinted in 14 
Envtl. Pol'y & L. 77 (1985); Recommendation on Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right 
of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, O.E.C.D. Doc. 
C(77)28, reprinted in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD and 
the Environment 150 (1986) [hereinafter OECD and the Environment]; 4 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 53 
(1978); 16 I.L.M. 977 (1977); Recommendation on Equal Right of Access in Relation to 
Transfrontier Pollution, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(76)55, reprinted in OECD and the Environment, 
supra, at 148; 2 Envt!. Pol'y & L. 104 (1976); 15 I.L.M. 1218 (1976); Recommendation on 
Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(74)224, reprinted in OECD 
and the Environment, supra, at 142; 1 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 44 (1975); 14 I.L.M. 242 (1975). 
While not creating formal international legal obligations, these precatory instruments 
nonetheless establish widely accepted standards for desirable or sound state practice. See, e.g., 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 Mich. J. 
Int'l L. 420 (1991); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Remarks, 82 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 381 (1988). A 
number of these "soft" undertakings have nevertheless matured, through widespread 
acceptance, into binding customary law. For example, Principle 21 of the 1972 Declaration of 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, following the maxim sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas, sets out the basic principle that 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). See generally Louis B. 
Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 Harv. Int'l L.J. 423 (1973). 
Although originally framed as a non-binding exhortation, Principle 21 over time has tended to 
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arise at the interface between international and national law. These 
interstices in the legal framework fall into at least two generic catego-
ries. First, developments on the international level may diverge from 
existing domestic legislative and regulatory schemes. Second, the 
implementation of international duties at the national level may 
encounter legal complications. This section examines case studies of 
each type of discontinuity. 
A. Executive Agreements Affecting Domestic Environmental 
Regimes 
The principle that an international agreement and a statute should 
be reconciled whenever possibles9 finds its most frequent application 
where there is an apparent conflict between an earlier international 
agreement and a later statute. However, two recent cases-both of 
which interpret environmental statutory schemes-suggest that 
courts may construe the requirements of existing domestic law in light 
of a subsequent international agreement. This approach can on occa-
sion disrupt existing legislative and regulatory structures in unpredict-
able and arguably unintended ways when, as in each of these cases, 
international obligations are contained in an executive agreement 
entered into based on the Executive Branch's unilateral interpretation 
of a statute and without Congressional approval or participation. 
In Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society,6O the 
Sqpreme Court construed the Packwood Amendment to the 
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act61 and the 
Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 196762 in light 
of a subsequent executive agreement63 with Japan. The existence of 
that agreement was decisive in the Court's rejection of arguments that 
a federal official had violated a statutory directive. 
Shortly after World War II, more than forty nations entered into a 
multilateral agreement known as the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling64 that created the International Whaling Com-
acquire the status of a substantive rule of international law. See, e.g., Restatement, supra note 
10, § 601 reporters' note 1 (1987); International Law Association, supra note 12, at 165 (reso-
lution concerning legal aspects of the conservation of the environment); Hancil, supra note 12, 
at 90. cr. supra note 12 (discussing Trail Smelter arbitration as evidence of custonuuy law). 
59. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
60. 478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
61. 16 u.s.c. § 1821(e)(2) [hereinafter Packwood Amendment]. 
62. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 [hereinafter Pelly Amendment]. 
63. Agreement Concerning Commercial Sperm Whaling in the Western Division Stock of 
the North Pacific, Nov. 13, 1984, United States-Japan T.LA.S. No. 11,070. 
64. Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948), 
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mission (lWC). The IWC has the power to set limits on the harvest-
ing of various whale species. An "opt-out" procedure allows each 
nation party to the Whaling Convention unilaterally to reject these 
quotas, rendering them legally ineffective with respect to that country. 
Although the quotas are binding on member nations that do not opt 
out, the IWC nevertheless has no power to impose sanctions for 
violations. 
The Pelly and Packwood Amendments attempt to reinforce the 
Whaling Convention on the domestic level by requiring the Secretary 
of Commerce to monitor the whaling activities of foreign nationals 
and to investigate potential violations of the Whaling Convention. 
Upon completion of this investigation, the Secretary must promptly 
decide whether to certify conduct by foreign nationals that "dimin-
ishes the effectiveness" of the Whaling Convention. After certifica-
tion by the Secretary, the Packwood Amendment directs the 
Secretary of State to reduce the offending nation's fishing allocation 
within the United States' fishery conservation zone by at least fifty per 
cent. 
In 1981, the IWC established a zero quota for harvests of sperm 
whales. During the next year, the Commission ordered a five-year 
moratorium on commercial whaling to begin in the 1985-86 season 
and to continue until 1990. Japan filed timely objections that effec-
tively relieved it, as an international legal matter, from compliance 
with the sperm whale quotas for 1982 through 1984. Nonetheless, Jhe 
potential sanction under the Pelly and Packwood Amendments by the 
United States threatened Japanese whaling for the 1984-85 season. 
After extensive negotiations, the United States and Japan concluded 
an executive agreement in which Japan agreed to catch no more than 
400 sperm whales in each of the 1984 and 1985 seasons. Japan also 
agreed to cease commercial whaling by 1988, three years after the 
date specified by the IWC. In return, the United States agreed not to 
certify Japan under the Pelly and Packwood Amendments. 
Suit was brought by several environmental organizations to compel 
the Secretary of Commerce to certify Japan. The Supreme Court, 
reversing both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, decided 
that the Secretary had no mandatory duty to certify in response to 
IWC quota violations. Although the bulk of the opinion deals with 
[hereinafter Whaling Convention]. See generally J.N. Tonnesen & A.O. Johnsen, A History of 
Modem Whaling (1982); James E. Scarff, The International Management of Whales, 
Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment, 6 Ecology L.Q. 323 (1977); Gore 
Smith, The International Whaling Commission: An Analysis of the Past and Reflections on 
the Future, 16 Na!,1 Res. Law. 543 (1984). 
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the construction of the Pelly and Packwood Amendments, it is clear 
that the chosen interpretation was strongly influenced by the existence 
of the agreement with Japan as an acceptable, if alternative, means of 
achieving the statutory goal.6S 
The international agreement at issue in this case was an executive 
agreement, entered into on behalf of the United States by the Presi-
dent without consent or input from the Congress. Neither of the 
applicable legislative enactments authorized the negotiation of the 
agreement, nor was the particular agreement with Japan endorsed by 
the Congress either before or after its conclusion.66 Although the 
question remains the subject of considerable debate, 67 some authority 
suggests that such an agreement must be consistent with existing leg-
islation.68 The Court avoided this problem by interpreting the conflict 
out of existence, but simultaneously contorted the statutory 
framework. 69 
65. In enacting these Amendments, Congress' primary goal was to protect and 
conserve whales and other endangered species. The Secretary furthered this 
objective by entering into the agreement with Japan, calling for that nation's 
acceptance of the worldwide moratorium on commercial whaling and the withdrawal 
of its objection to the !WC zero sperm whale quota, in exchange for a transition 
period of limited additional whaling .... 
We conclude. therefore. that the Secretary's decision to secure the certainty of 
Japan's future compliance with the !WC's program through the 1984 executive 
agreement, rather than rely on the possibility that certification and imposition of 
economic sanctions would produce the same or better result, is a reasonable 
construction of the Pe1ly and Packwood Amendments. 
Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 241. 
66. Indeed, in July 1984 Senator Packwood explicitly requested the nssurances of the 
Secretary of Commerce that "any nation which continues whaling after the moratorium tllkes 
effect will be certified under" the statutory enactment bearing the Senator's name. tetter from 
Senator Bob Packwood to Malcolm Baldrige. Secretary of Commerce Qune 28, 1984), quoted 
in Brief for Respondents at 17-18, Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 
(1986) (Nos. 85-954 & 85-955). 
67. See. e.g., Restatement, supra note 10, § 115 reporters' note 5: Henkin, supra note 35, at 
186, 432-33 n.42. 
68. See supra note 38 (citing cases of judicial invalidation of executive agreements 
inconsistent with statute). The House of Representatives explicitly and forcefully raised this 
issue. arguing that the foreign affairs context of the case should not affect the Court's 
construction of the statutory directives to the Executive Branch at issue in Japan Whaling. See 
Brief of Amici Curiae Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group of the House of 
Representatives, Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (Nos. 85-
954 & 85-955). See generally Note. Narrow Grounds for a Complex Decision: The Supreme 
Court's Review of an Agency's Statutory Construction in Japan Whaling Association v. 
American Cetacean Society, 14 Ecology L.Q. 509 (1987) (criticizing Supreme Court opinion in 
Japan Whaling for unjustified deference to Executive Branch interpretation of statutory 
directive and excessive sensitivity to foreign affairs overtones). 
69. Significantly, the Court rejected arguments that the domestic legal effect of the executive 
agreement with Japan was a non justiciable "political question," that plaintiffs were not entitled 
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Greenpeace USA v. Stone 70 is among the most recent cases address-
ing environmental effects outside the United States under the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).71 The court in 
that case made clear that its conclusion that NEP A did not apply was 
to relief because of the absence of a private right of action, and that the challenged 
governmental action was unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 551-559, 701-706. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 n.4 (1986). See supra notes 54 & 
55 (discussing private rights of action and political question doctrine). Accordingly, the Court 
based its conclusion that the executive agreement was an acceptable alternative to the statutory 
procedure as an adjudication on the merits of the legal relationship between the statute and the 
agreement. 
70. 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Hawaii 1990), appeal dismissed as moot, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (EIS analyzing effects abroad not 
required for issuance of nuclear export license, but not deciding whether NEPA applies to 
other major federal actions with extraterritorial effects); Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991) (dismissing complaint alleging application ofNEPA 
to activities of United States government in Antarctica because statute not intended to apply to 
extraterritorial impacts). See also Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. United 
States Dep't of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978) (applicability of NEPA to pesticide 
spraying in Mexico to destroy marijuana plants assumed without deciding); Gemeinschaft zum 
Schutz des Berliner Baumbestandes v. Marienthal, 9 Envt!. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,011 
(D.D.C. 1978) (construction of apartment complex in West Berlin not a federal project); Sierra 
Club v. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53, 421 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 1975, 1976) (assuming 
applicability of NEP A to highway through Panama and Colombia), vacated sub nom Sierra 
Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 391 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (declining to decide issue in view of 
impacts in United States); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Agency for Int'l 
Dev., 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,121 (D.D.C. 1975) (stipulation requiring Agency for 
International Development to promulgate regulations on environmental analysis of activities 
with effects outside United States); Sierra Club v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 6 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1980, 4 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,685 (D.D.C. 1974) (ordering agency to 
prepare EIS for reactor export licenses and uranium enrichment activities); People of 
Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 816-19 (D. Hawaii 1973) (application to trust territory). 
See generally Gaines, "Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions": An 
Executive Order Ordains a National Policy, 3 Harv. Envt!. L. Rev. 136 (1979); Therese M. 
Welsh, Note, Agency Responses to Executive Order 12,114: A Comparison and Implications, 
14 Cornell Int'l L.J. 481 (1981); Note, Executive Order on Extraterritorial Environmental 
Impacts, 13 J. Int'l L. & Econ. 455 (1979); Francis M. Allegra, Note, Executive Order 
12,114-Environmental Effects Abroad: Does It Really Further the Purpose of NEPA?, 29 
Clev. St. L. Rev. 109 (1980); John C. Peirce, Note, Exports and Environmental Responsibility: 
Applying NEPA to the Export-Import Bank, 12 Cornell Int'l L.J. 247 (1979); Sue D. 
Sheridan, Note, The Extraterritorial Application ofNEPA Under Executive Order 12,114, 13 
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 173 (1980); Note, The Extraterritorial Scope ofNEPA's Environmental 
Impact Statement Requirement, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 349 (1976); J.D. Head, Comment, Federal 
Agency Responsibility to Assess Extraterritorial Environmental Impacts, 14 Tex. Int'l L.J. 
425 (1979); Christopher G. Lehmann, Note, The International Application of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969: A New Strategy, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 1063; Glenn Pincus, 
Note, The "NEPA-Abroad" Controversy: Unresolved by an Executive Order, 30 Buffalo L. 
Rev. 611 (1981); President Orders Environmental Review oflnternational Actions, 9 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envt!. L. Inst.) 10,011 (1979). 
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strongly influenced by an agreement that the court found had been 
made between President Bush and Chancellor Kohl of Germany. 
This case concerned a plan of the United States Army and the 
Department of Defense, together with the German Army, to remove 
obsolete chemical weapons from a storage site in Clausen, Germany. 
The weapons were to be transported by rail and ship to Johnston 
Atoll, a United States Territory in the Pacific Ocean, pursuant to a 
Congressional mandate directing the destruction of the entire United 
States chemical weapons inventory by 1997. Environmental Impact 
Statements (BISs) required by NEPA had been prepared for the fed-
eral actions on Johnston Atoll. Plaintiffs challenged the Govern-
ment's failure to prepare a comprehensive EIS covering all aspects of 
the transportation and disposal of the European stockpile, including 
transit through Germany and transport over the ocean. 
Relying on the political question doctrine, the court denied plain-
tiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order enjoining the removal 
of the stockpile from Germany.72 In both that decision and an opin-
ion denying plaintiffs' further motion for a preliminary injunction,73 
the District Court gave substantial weight to foreign policy concerns. 
In particular, the court emphasized the significance of what it charac-
terized as an agreement between President Bush, through Secretary of 
State Baker, and Chancellor Kohl, according to which the United 
States pledged to remove the stockpile by December 1990. The court 
explicitly articulated the crucial importance of this purported agree-
ment to its reasoning.74 
Like the agreement in Japan Whaling, the Bush-Kohl arrangement 
in the Greenpeace case was concluded without Congressional partici-
pation. Indeed, by comparison with the instrument in Japan Whal-
ing, this "agreement" was never reduced to a single written 
instrument and was closer to a unilateral statement of purpose.7S If 
72. Greenpeace, 21 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,378, 20,381 (D. Hawaii 1990). 
73. Greenpeace, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Hawaii 1990), appeal dismissed as moot, 924 F.2d 175 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
74. The existence of this agreement played an important pan of this court's denial of 
plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order. It is an important 
consideration in determining whether defendants complied with NEPA under the 
specific facts of this case and therefore, plaintiffs strongly contest it. 
Id. at 758 n.7. Other factors that affected the court's conclusion that NEPA did apply to 
environmental impacts beyond the territory of the United States included Congressional intent 
in enacting the statute and the existence of Exec. Order No. 12,114,44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979), 
3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982 & Supp. v 1987), on the environmen-
tal effects abroad of major federal actions. See 748 F. Supp. at 758·63. 
75. See Affidavit of James F. Dobbins, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
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so, that undertaking would not even rise to the level of an interna-
tional agreement in the legal sense.76 
NEP A is the "basic national charter for protection of the environ-
ment. "77 A cornerstone of NEP A law is the necessity to provide 
opportunities for public input, including notice of a proposed action, 
an opportunity to comment on a draft EIS, and the necessity for 
Executive Branch agencies preparing EISs to respond to public com-
ments.78 As a general matter, these requirements apply as well to 
international agreements.79 Accordingly, if the Bush-Kohl arrange-
ment is an international agreement, as the court seemed to accept in 
its opinion, that agreement might well have been subject to NEP A 
European and Canadian Affairs, Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Hawaii 
1990) (No. 90-588). 
76. See Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (instructing Secretary of State to "transmit 
to the Congress the text of any international agreement (including the text of any oral 
international agreement, which agreement shall be reduced to writing), other than a treaty, to 
which the United States is a party as soon as practicable after such agreement has entered into 
force with respect to the United States but in no event later than sixty days thereafter"); 22 
C.F.R. § 181.2 (State Department regulations establishing criteria for determining whether 
undertaking intended to be binding and therefore international agreement and noting that 
form of undertaking is relevant but not decisive to determination of intent); Restatement, 
supra note 10, § 301 cmt. e & reporters' note 2 (non-binding "gentlemen's agreements" nre not 
international agreements). 
77. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (Council on Environmental Quality implementing regulations). 
78. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 15oo.2(d) (statement of federal policy to "[e]ncourage and 
facilitate public involvement in decisions which affect the quality of the human environment"); 
id. § 1501.7 (necessity as part of scoping process to "[i]nvite the participation of ... interested 
persons (including those who might not be in accord with the action on environmental 
grounds)"); id. § 1503.1 (necessity, with respect to draft EIS, to "[r]equest comments from the 
public, affirmatively soliciting comments from those persons or organization who may be 
interested or affected"); id. § 1506.6 (instructions to agencies requiring public involvement in 
NEPA process); Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970) (directing federal agencies to 
"[d]evelop procedures to ensure the fullest practicable provision of timely information and 
understanding of Federal plans and programs with environmental impact in order to obtain 
the views of interested parties"); Colony Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 296, 304 
(W.D. Pa. 1980) ("Citizen participation is a vital ingredient in the success of NEPA •... An 
opportunity for local citizens or other interested parties to participate in the preparation of the 
environmental analysis is mandatory under NEPA.") (emphasis in original); Burkey v. Ellis, 
483 F. Supp. 897, 916 (N.D. Ala. 1979) ("[NEPA] and the [Council on Environmental 
Quality] Guidelines promulgated under it are designed to encourage public participation in the 
decision-making process."). 
79. See 22 C.F.R. § 161.5 (State Department regulations implementing NEPA, expressly 
contemplating application to international agreements); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(I) (Council on 
Environmental Quality'S definition of "major Federal action," including "treaties and 
international conventions or agreements"). But see Public Citizen v. Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, No. 91-1916, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 122 (D. D.C. Jan. 7, 1992) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (dismissing complaint alleging application of NEPA to 
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations in GATT and North American Free Trade Agreement 
on standing and ripeness grounds). 
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and its implementing regulations, including provisions for full disclo-
sure and public participation. The court did not discuss whether 
NEPA applied to the creation of the Bush-Kohl arrangement instead 
of its implementation,80 thereby excluding the statute's application at 
both stages. If, on the other hand, that arrangement did not rise to 
the level of an international agreement, the implications are even 
more profound. Then the court's opinion strongly suggests that the 
routine, day-to-day conduct of foreign relations by the Executive 
Branch-often undertaken in secrecy without notice to, input from, 
or scrutiny by the Congress or the public81-may frustrate or attenu-
ate otherwise dispositive statutory directives. 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (BCE),82 
has been working for more than a decade on questions of air pollu-
tion, especially acid rain as a regional problem in Europe. After nego-
tiations sponsored under the ECE's auspices, a Convention on Long-
Ran~e Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP),83 was concluded in 
1979. An ancillary Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of 
Nitrogen Oxides (NOJ or Their Transboundary Fluxes, designed to 
address one of the principal precursors of acid rain, was signed in 
Sofia in 1988.84 Another Protocol Concerning the Control of Emis-
sions of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCS) or Their Trans-
80. Cf. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (1974), cert. 
denied. 421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (suggesting that non.binding international statements of intent 
need not comply with statute). 
81. See, e.g., FOIA, 5 U.S.c. § 552(b)(1) (exempting from disclosure matters "specifically 
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
.•. foreign policy"); Exec. Order No. 12,356,47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982),3 C.F.R. 166 (1983) 
reprinted in 50 U.S.c.A. 401 (West Supp. 1989) (classification order). Cf. 22 C.F.R. 
§ 161.7(b)(1) (categorically excluding from NEPA "[r]outine conduct of [State Depmment) 
and overseas political and economic functions. including . • . communicating to host 
governments United States Government views [and) maintaining contact with foreign 
officials"); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.12 (excluding "the President, including the performance of staff 
functions for the President in his Executive Office" from NEPA's coverage). 
82. Members of ECE, which was established in 1947, include all European states. the 
United States. and Canada. See generally Amasa S. Bishop & Robert D. Munro, The UN 
Regional Economic Commissions and Environmental Problems. 26 Int'l Organization 348, 
358-68 (1972); Gunnar Myrdal, Twenty Years of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe, 22 Int'l Organization 617 (1968). 
83. Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,541; reprinted in 6 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 104 (1980); Int'l 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3001; 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979) [hereillllfter LRTAP Convention). 
Through 1991, thirty-two states and European Community (EC) were parties to the LRTAP 
Convention, which entered into force in 1983. See generally Amy A. Fraenkel, The 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution: Meeting the Challenge of 
International Cooperation, 30 Harv. Int'l LJ. 447 (1989). 
84. See supra note 14. The NO. Protocol entered into force on February 14, 1991. The 
United States is not party to an earlier protocol to LRTAP, concluded in 1985 in Helsinki, 
concerning sulfur emissions. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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boundary Fluxes, intended to control one of the main causes of 
photochemical smog pollution, was signed in Geneva late last year.8S 
After articulating a nebulous commitment to "limit and, as far as pos-
sible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution," the LRTAP Con-
vention sets out a general framework for cooperation, consultation, 
and exchange of information on air pollution. By contrast, the NOli 
Protocol states an overall obligation to level off emissions at 1987 
levels by 1994, and enumerates precise engineering requirements for 
mobile and stationary sources of nitrogen oxide pollutants. Likewise, 
the VOC Protocol contains overall emissions targets and timetables, 
supplemented by detailed technological requirements. 
In structure and level of detail, the LR TAP Convention and the 
NOli and VOC Protocols are very much analogs, in the field of acid 
rain and tropospheric air pollution, to the Vienna Convention86 and 
Montreal Protocol87 on stratospheric ozone depletion. The United 
States, as a domestic legal matter, entered into both the Vienna Con-
vention and the Montreal Protocol as treaties within the meaning of 
the Constitution after Senate advice and consent to ratification. The 
LRTAP Convention and the NOli and VOC Protocols, however, were 
undertaken as executive agreements without Congressional participa-
tion. Likewise, after the enactment of the acid rain provisions of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,88 the United States concluded a 
new pact with Canada on acid rain as an executive agreement. 89 
However, unlike its practice in the preparations leading to the Mon-
treal Protocol,9O the Executive Branch gave no public notice in the 
Federal Register of, and did not solicit comment on, any of these 
agreements. Despite the lack of formal notice, the Executive Branch 
has informally consulted with interested members of Congress and 
the public with respect to these air pollution pacts concluded as exec-
utive agreements. 
85. November 19, 1991 [hereinafter VOC Protocol]. 
86. See supra note 29. 
87. See supra note 5. 
88. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 §§ 401-416, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 
2584-2634 (1990), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-76510 (acid rain program). 
89. Agreement on Air Quality, United States-Canada, Mar. 13, 1991, Int') Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 31:0701; 30 I.L.M. 676 (1991). International environmental agreements on subjects 
other than air pollution have also been done as executive agreements. E.g., Agreement on 
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, 
Aug. 14, 1983, United States-Mexico, T.I.A.S. No. 10,827; reprinted in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 
31:1401; 22 I.L.M. 1025 (1983); Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Nov. 22,1978, United 
States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257, 1153 U.N.T.S. 187, amended, Oct. 16, 
1983, T.I.A.S. No. 10,798, amended, Nov. 18, 1987. 
90. See supra note 32. 
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These agreements may nonetheless have serious domestic legal 
implications, notwithstanding the prior existence of statutory and reg-
ulatory mechanisms for domestic implementation. The Executive 
Branch appears to have chosen the instrument of an executive agree-
ment instead of an article II, section 2 treaty in each case because the 
implementing authority, both statutory and regulatory, necessary to 
fulfill the obligations in the agreement was already in place as a mat-
ter of domestic law.91 The Clean Air Act does not expressly authorize 
or anticipate international agreements on air pollution issues such as 
those covered by these bilateral and regional agreements addressing 
acid rain, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds. Anoma-
lously, the two stratospheric ozone agreements, which, in contrast to 
the EeE air pollution agreements and the acid rain pact with Canada, 
were expressly authorized by statute,92 were concluded as article II, 
section 2 treaties,93 notwithstanding that no new implementing legis-
lation was required.94 
"Locking in" the status quo at the international level through uni-
lateral action by the Executive Branch may constrain future legisla-
tive or administrative action in a manner arguably inconsistent with 
Congressional intent. Both statutory9S and constitutional96 avenues 
for petitioning the Executive for regulatory modifications may be 
compromised. The lack of formal notice may deprive the public of an 
opportunity to comment on a policy-making juncture at least as 
important as many administrative regulations. 
91. See supra notes 48 & 51. The United States accepted the NOA Protocol on July 13, 
1989. The United States signed the VOC Protocol on November 19, 1991. At the time of 
these agreements, the technology-based standards for nitrogen oxides and volatile organic 
compounds in those agreements had been implemented domestically through notice-and-
comment rulemaking proceedings pursuant to general statutory mandates then contained in 
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1986), administered by EPA. See Clean Air Act 
§ 307(d), 42 U.S.c. § 7607(d) (rulemaking). Those requirements were confirmed and 
augmented in the acid rain program mandated by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
§ 407, PUb. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2613 (1990), 42 U.S.c. § 7651. 
92. cr. Clean Air Act § 617, 42 U.S.c. § 7671p (directing and authorizing President to 
enter into international agreements "to develop standards and resolutions which protect the 
stratosphere" from ozone depletion); Clean Air Act § 156, 42 U.S.c. 7456 (repealed 1990) 
(same). 
93. See supra notes 5 & 29. 
94. S. Treaty Doc. No. 10, l00th Cong., 1st Sess. VIII (1987) (Montreal Protocol); S. 
Treaty Doc. No.9, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. vii (1985) (Vienna Convention). 
95. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 126(b), 42 U.S.c. § 7426(b) (authorizing state or political 
subdivision to petition EPA to abate interstate air pollution). cr. Toxic Substances Control 
Act § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 2620 (citizens' petitions) [hereinafter TSCA]. 
96. cr. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law •.• abridging •.• the right of the 
people ..• to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. "). 
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B. Recent Developments on Trade 
A number of recent examples of significant discontinuities have 
arisen between international trade regimes and national environmen-
tal legal requirements. Indeed, an unexpected and vociferous public 
debate has erupted over the application of existing international trade 
agreements to environmental matters and the contents of proposed 
trade pacts.97 While it is too early to identify all of the nuances that 
may arise, the examples discussed in this section suggest that the 
interface between international trade law and the domestic law of the 
environment will continue to generate significant legal questions. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),98 the prin-
97. See, e.g., Arden-Clarke, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Environmental 
Protection and Sustainable Development (WWF Discussion Paper June 1991); Steve 
Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, 25 J. World 
Trade, No.5, Oct. 1991, at 37; Kyle E. McSlarrow, International Trade and the Environment: 
Building a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 21 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,589 
(1991); Eliza Patterson, International Trade and the Environment: Institutional Solutions, 21 
Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,599 (1991); Stuart Auerbach, Raising a Roar Over a Ruling: 
Trade Pact Imperils Environmental Laws, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1991, at Dl; Eric Christensen, 
Pesticide Regulation and International Trade, Env't, Nov. 1990, at 2; Mark Ritchie, GATT, 
Agriculture and the Environment: The U.S. Double Zero Plan, 20 Ecologist, Nov.-Dec. 1990, 
at 214; Shrybman, International Trade and the Environment: An Environmental Assessment 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 20 Ecologist, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 30; Joan 
Claybrook, Fast Track Can be Hazardous to Your Health, Wash. Post, May 17, 1991, at A25. 
See generally Jeanne J. Grimmett, Environmental Regulation and GATT (Congressional 
Research Service, 1991); Seymour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham, eds., Managing Trade 
Relations in the 1980s: Issues Involved in the GATT Ministerial Meeting of 1982 (1982). 
98. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, arts. XI.l & XX(b), 61 Stat. 
(5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATf), reprinted in 4 BISD, supra 
note 21. The GATT, which was adopted after World War II to encourage freer trade, has 
over a hundred state contracting parties, and others apply the General Agreement on a de 
facto basis. See generally Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic 
Organization (1969); Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade 
Diplomacy (1975); Jackson, supra note 22; Edmond McGovern, International Trade 
Regulation (2d ed. 1988); Kenneth R. Simmonds & Brian H.W. Hill, Law and Practice Under 
the GATT (1988). The United States has entered into most trade agreements after the GATT 
as executive agreements authorized by prior statute. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974 § 101, 19 
U.S.C. § 2111 (authorizing negotiation of trade agreements, including Tokyo Round of Trade 
Negotiations in GATT and United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement); Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1102, 19 U.S.C. § 2902 (same, including Uruguay Round 
of Trade Negotiations in GATT and North American Free Trade Agreement); Restatement, 
supra note 10, § 303 cmt. e & reporters' notes 8 & 9. The implementing legislation for both the 
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations in GATT, infra note 101, and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), infra note 104, are subject to so-called "fast track" 
procedures that limit Congress's power of amendment. See 19 U.S.C. § 2191 & 2903; 137 
Congo Rec. S6765-S6829 (May 24, 1991) (rejecting resolution pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2192 
disapproving President's request for extension of fast track negotiating authority with respect 
to Uruguay Round and NAFTA); 137 Congo Rec. H3517-H3589 (May 23, 1991) (same). But 
see H.R. Res. 146, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 Congo Rec. H3589-H3590 (May 23, 1991) 
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cipal multilateral instrument governing international trade relations 
among states, explicitly exempts from its coverage measures "neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."99 Partially as a 
result of a bitter dispute between the United States and the European 
Community (BC) over the use of hormones to promote growth in cat-
tle,1°O the ongoing revisions to the GAIT known as the Uruguay 
Round of Trade Negotiations101 explicitly treat certain measures to 
protect public health, such as limitations on pesticide residues in food, 
(reiterating Congressional prerogative to modify fast track resolution at any time if Executive 
Branch ignores environmental objectives in North American Free Trade Agreement 
negotiations). 
99. GATT, supra note 98, art. XX(b) (exception "[s]ubject to the requirement that such 
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute Ii means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or Ii 
disguised restriction on international trade.") cr. id. art. XX(g) (exempting measures 
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natura1 resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption''). A GATT 
Working Group on Environmental Measures in International Trade, which was established in 
1971 but never met, has now been convened. The agenda of the Group includes c.lCnmining 
trade provisions contained in existing multilateral environmental agreements such as the 
Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, and CITES. See GATT Focus, Oct. 1991, at 1. See 
also GATT, Trade and the Environment, in International Trade (1990-91) (1992) (m press). 
Presumably, the application of the trade measures identified in these environmental 
agreements as between contracting parties to GATT that are not also p3rties to the agreement 
in question could violate the GATT. cr. GATT, supra note 98, art. XXV(S) (authorizing 
waiver of obligations by two-thirds vote comprising more than half total number of 
contracting parties). See also Economic Declaration: Building World Partnership ~ IS, 
reprinted in 27 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 968 (Iuly 22, 1991) (statement of Group of Seven 
major industrialized nations asserting the need for GAIT "to define how trade measures can 
properly be used for environmental purposes"); BISD, supra note 21, at 402 (36th Supp. 1990) 
(GATT Council decision establishing the Working Group on the Export of Domestically 
Prohibited Goods and Other Hazardous Substances). 
100. This continuing dispute began in December of 1985 when the Council ofMiniste.rs of 
the European Community (EC) enacted a ban, to be effective Ianuary 1, 1988, on the use of 
growth hormones in the breeding of cattle and on the sale of beef treated with growth 
hormones. The United States, threatening retaliatory action, strongly objected to the ban as Ii 
non-tariff barrier to trade unsupported by scientific evidence. Despite the Community's 
postponement of the date of the ban on sales until Ianuary I, 1989, the United States and the 
EC were unable to resolve the dispute. Shortly after the ban went into effect at the beginning 
of 1989, the United States imposed a 100% tariff on Ii variety of European foodstuffs. Neither 
side, however, has requested the establishment of a dispute settlement p3I1el pursuant to the 
GATT. See generally Steven I. Rothberg, From Beer to BST: Circumventing the GATT 
Standards Code's Prohibition on Unnecessary Obstacles to Trade, 75 Minn. 1.. Rev. 50S 
(1990); Michael B. Froman, The United States-European Community Hormone Treated Beef 
Conflict, 30 Harv. Int'l LJ. 549 (1989); Adrian Rafael Halpern, The U.S.-EC Beef 
Controversy and the Standards Code: Implications for the Application ofHcalth Regulations 
to Agricultura1 Trade, 14 N.CJ. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 13S (1989). 
101. See generally The New GATT Round of Multi1atera\ Trade Negotiations: Legal and 
Economic Problems (E. Petersmann & M. Hilf cd. 1988); Seymour I. Rubin & Mark 1.. Iones, 
Conflict and Resolution in US-EC Trade Relations at the Opening of the Uruguay Round 
(1989). 
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as potential trade barriers. Under the rubric of "harmonization" of 
"sanitary and phytosanitary measures," the Uruguay Round would 
explicitly subordinate this category of regulatory activity to the 
GA'IT international trade regime. 102 Moreover, domestic regulatory 
102. Draft Final Act, supra note 22, § L, pt. C (draft including proposed decision by 
contracting parties on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures). See generally 
Peter Saravic & Hans Van Houtte, eds. Legal Issues in International Trade 128-44 (1990) 
(discussing harmonization). For instance, such measures must be "based on scientific 
principles and ... not maintained against available scientific evidence." Id. ~ 6. It is, however, 
axiomatic that many such actions under United States law are justified despite the fact that 
they may involve considerable scientific uncertainty and that scientists may not be in 
agreement: 
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, 
uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the 
regulations designed to protect the public health, and the decision that of an expert 
administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect. 
Such proof may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the statute is 
to be served. 
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). See also Reserve Mining Co. 
v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 528 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) ("In the context of [the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act], we believe that Congress used the term 'endangering' in a precaution-
ary or preventive sense, and, therefore, evidence of potential harm as well as actual harm 
comes within the purview of that term."). See generally Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic 
Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 Ecology L.Q. 207 (1978). Moreover, the multidisciplinary 
process of choosing regulatory measures-"risk management"-is distinct from the strictly 
scientific basis for regulatory action-"risk assessment:" 
Risk management, which is carried out by regulatory agencies under various legisla-
tive mandates, is an agency decision-making process that entails consideration of 
political, social, economic, and engineering information with risk-related [scientific] 
information to develop, analyze, and compare regulatory options and to select the 
appropriate regulatory response to a potential chronic health hazard. The selection 
process necessarily requires the use of value judgments on such issues as the accepta-
bility of risk and the reasonableness of the costs of control. 
National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Pro-
cess 18-19 (1983). In the determination of risk, national standards are to "tak[e] into account 
risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organizations." Draft Final 
Act, supra note 22, § L, pt. C, para. 16. Further, there is a presumption in favor of the adop-
tion on the national level of substantive "international standards, guidelines or recommenda-
tions." Id. ~~ 9-11. However, a large number of these international standards for issues like 
pesticide residues in food are less stringent than international standards, such as those estab-
lished in the Codex Alimentarius. Standards set by international bodies, like maximum limits 
for pesticide residues established in the Codex Alimentarius, are not necessarily as stringent as 
domestic regulatory requirements in the United States. See, e.g., Gen. Accounting Office, 
International Food Safety: Comparison of U.S. and Codex Pesticides Standards 4 (1991) 
("Among the pesticides studied that EPA has rated as probable carcinogens, the United States 
has lower MRLs [maximum residue levels] in 55 percent of the cases; the Codex, in only 27 
percent"). See generally Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations & World 
Health Organization, Codex Alimentarius Commission: Procedural Manual (7th ed. 1989). 
Moreover, the Uruguay Round draft text would require central governments in federal states 
like the United States to preempt standards of subsidiary governmental units. Draft Final Act, 
supra note 22, § L, pt. C, ~ 45. Cf. id. pt. G (draft agreement on technical barriers to trade). 
An earlier proposal, supported by the United States, would have made any pesticide tolerances 
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activity on issues like pesticide residues would be subject to interna-
tional scrutiny through compulsory adjudicatory or "dispute settle-
ment" mechanisms under the GAIT.I03 As the current United States 
statutory scheme for controlling contaminants in food does not antici-
pate an international review procedure, it is far from clear what effect 
this new development will have on domestic law and regulation in this 
area. 1M 
stricter than the Codex Alimentarius per se a violation of the GATT. See Christensen, supra 
note 91. In any event, the GAIT has little scientific or technical capacity on which to draw to 
adjudicate violations of these standards in concrete cases before dispute settlement ~els. 
103. GAIT, supra note 98, art. XXIII (nullification or impairment); GATT, 
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, 
BISD, supra note 21, at 210 (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter 1979 UnderstandingJj GATT, 
Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement Procedures, BISD, supra note 21, at 13 (29th 
Supp. 1983); GATT, Decision on Improvements to the GAIT Dispute Settlement Rules and 
Procedures, BISD, supra note 21, at 61 (36th Supp. 1990). The GATT's dispute settlement 
mechanisms first encourage contracting parties to the agreement to settle differences through 
consultation and negotiation. GAIT, supra note 98, art. XXII (consultation). If that 
mechanism is unsuccessful, an aggrieved party may submit a complaint to the GATT Council, 
which can appoint a panel of experts to hear the dispute. The panel's report, which may find 
that the agreement has been "nullified or impaired," must be accepted by the Council to have 
legal force. See generally William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 Fordham Int'l 
LJ. 51 (1988) (summary of GAIT dispute settlement mechanisms) [hereinafter Davey, 
Dispute Settlement in GATIl; William J. Davey, Remarks, 84 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 135 
(1990) (describing recent changes in GAIT dispute settlement procedures). GATT ~els 
may also award compensation to, and authorize retaliatory countermeasures by, injured states. 
GAIT, supra note 98, art. XXIIIj GATT Understanding Regarding Notification, 
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, BISD, supra note 21, at 210, Annex, 1i 4 
(26th Supp. 1980). Retaliation has only once been authorized by a GATT dispute settlement 
panel. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, supra, at 60. Unless adopted by the GATT 
Council, which ordinarily operates by consensus, the report has no legal force. Accordingly, a 
"losing" state may unilaterally block an effective finding of nullification or impairment See id. 
However, further strengthening of the GATT's dispute settlement procedures has ~ a 
priority in the Uruguay Round. See GAIT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, 
BISD, supra note 21, at 19 (26th Supp. 1987). In particular, the Draft FmaI Act specifies that 
panel reports shall be adopted by the GAIT Council within sixty days of issuance. See Draft 
Fmal Act, supra note 22, § S 1114.4 (draft understanding on rules and procedures governing 
the settlement of disputes under articles XXII and XXIII of the GAm. A standing appellate 
body, whose reports must be adopted by the Council within thirty days of issuance unless 
rejected by consensus, is also created. lei. 111115.1-.14. 
104. If anything, the North American Free Trade Agreement, a proposed regional P:lct 
with Mexico and Canada, may have even more profound environmental imp:lcts. See 
generally 56 Fed. Reg. 32,454 (1991) (notice of North American Free Trade Agreement); 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Review of U.S.-Mexico Environmental Issues 
(1992); Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of 
a North American Free Trade Agreement (May 1, 1991) (transmission of President to 
Congress); Environmental Protection Agency & Secretarla de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia, 
Integrated Environmental PIan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area (FU'St Stage, 1992-1994) 
(1992). There is a principled theoretical approach that provides a basis for reconciling these 
clashes between environment and trade policies. A 1972 OECD recommendation articulates 
the so-called "Polluter-Pays Principle," intended as an international minimum standard 
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The Mexican Tuna dispute in GAIT initially arose over the killing 
of dolphin incidental to fishing for yellow fin tuna with "purse-seine" 
nets. The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)lOS directs the 
Secretary of the Treasury to ban the importation of yellowfin tuna 
requiring the internalization of environmental costs for the express purpose of eliminating 
trade distortions arising from disparate domestic environmental policies. Recommendation on 
Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, 
O.E.C.D. Doc. C(72)128, reprinted in OECD and the Environment, supra note 58, at 23 
[hereinafter 1972 Recommendation]. See also Recommendation on the Implementation of the 
Polluter-Pays Principle, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(74)223, reprinted in OECD and the Environment, 
supra note 58, at 26. Accordingly, failure to implement the Polluter-Pays Principle can be 
characterized as "pollution subsidy" that creates unfair trade advantages for industries in 
those states with environmental policies below the international minimum standard. The 
GAIT for some time has addressed the elimination of subsidies that produce trade distortions. 
See, e.g, GAIT, supra note 98, arts. VI, XVI (subsidies and countervailing duties); GAIT, 
Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, BISD, supra note 21, at 56 (26th Supp. 1980) 
(GAIT Subsidies Code). See also Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, BISD, 
supra note 21, at 19 (33rd Supp. 1987) (agricultural subsidies); Draft Final Act, supra note 22, 
§ I (subsidies and countervailing duties). Nonetheless, although the GAIT permits 
application of the Polluter-Pays Principle as a domestic environmental measure, the agreement 
does not authorize the enforcement of that standard with respect to imported goods through 
at-the-border measures like fees to offset the costs to domestic industries of pollution control 
measures. See GAIT, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, 
BISD, supra note 21, at 136 mI5.2.3-.7 (34th Supp. 1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1596 (1988). 
Cf. 1972 Recommendation, Annex 11 13 ("[e]ffective implementation of the [Polluter-Pays 
Principle] will make it unnecessary and undesirable to resort to" at-the-border measures). 
Consequently, because its jurisdiction is circumscribed by the subject matter of the underlying 
agreement, the GAIT dispute settlement process, unlike the domestic institution of judicial 
review of administrative action, can only result in a decision that an environmental measure is 
either valid or not justified based on the trade rules articulated in the agreement. As the 
agreement is currently structured, that process cannot serve as a forum for determining 
whether a state has failed to take minimum environmental measures. Cf. APA § lO(e), 5 
U.S.C. § 706(1) (directing reviewing court to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed"). See generally United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement: Hearing 
Before the Sub-Comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the 
House Comm. on the JUdiciary, l00th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (addressing constitutionality of 
panel dispute mechanism in article 1904 of United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, 27 
I.L.M. 281 (1988), that displaces domestic judicial review). See also 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) 
(limiting domestic judicial review of determination of binational dispute settlement panel in 
antidumping and countervailing duty cases under United States-Canada Free-Trade 
Agreement); Exec. Order No. 12,662 § 3, 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note (acceptance by President of 
decisions of binational dispute settlement panels in antidumping and countervailing duty cases 
under United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement). Revision of the GAIT's approach to 
subsidies to address the elimination of such "pollution subsidies," while not a panacea, would 
go a long way toward resolving conflicts between environmental and trade policies. See 
generally Arden-Clarke, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Environmental 
Protection and Sustainable Development (WWF Discussion Paper June 1991); Patterson, 
supra note 97. 
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 [hereinafter MMPA]. See generally Caroline E. Coulston, Flipper 
Caught in the Net of Commerce: Reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act and 
Its Effect on Dolphin, 11 J. Energy, Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 97 (1990). 
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caught by foreign nations unless the Secretary of Commerce makes a 
finding that the incidental take of marine mammals is comparable to 
that of United States vessels. Ruling on a motion for a preliminary 
injunction made by a number of environmental organizations, the 
District Court for the Northern District of California in August 1990 
enjoined Executive Branch officials from permitting further tuna 
imports into the United States because the required finding had not 
been made.106 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's order, 
which affected tuna imports from Mexico and several other 
countries. 107 
Mexico then requested the GAIT Council to establish a dispute 
settlement panel to adjudicate the validity under the GAIT of the 
MMP A ban. The three-member dispute settlement panel noted that 
discrimination by importing states based on the methods by which 
foreign goods are produced, as opposed to characteristics of the for-
eign goods themselves, is not warranted by the GAIT. Consequently, 
the GAIT requires competitive treatment of imported products as 
such without regard to the environmental policies of the country of 
export. lOS Further, the exceptions in the GAIT for trade measures 
directed at the protection of animal life or health or the conservation 
of natural resources109 must be narrowly construed. In light of that 
interpretation, the drafting history of the agreement, and the broader 
implications for international trade, the panel concluded that trade 
measures to protect resources outside the jurisdiction of a contracting 
party are not permissible.110 Further, the United States had failed to 
demonstrate that the import restriction was primarily aimed at con-
servation, or that measures less burdensome to international trade 
such were unavailable.111 Despite the decision in its favor, Mexico 
106. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), nff'd, 929 F.ld 
1449 (9th Cir. 1991). This case arose after the Executive Branch had failed to respond to three 
statutory directives mandating a ban on imported fish: the originnl 1972 MMPA and 
amendments enacted in 1984 and 1988. 746 F. Supp. at 967-68. 
107. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.ld 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit 
had previously granted a stay pending appeal with respect to imports from Mexico. Id. at 
1452 n.3. The Court of Appeals then affirmed a second order of the District Court, issued 
after a conclusion that the federal defendants' finding that Mexico satisfied the statutory 
standard of the MMPA was illegal. Id. at 1451-52. The District Court, on plaintiffs' motion, 
extended the ban to intermediary nations that purchase yellowfin tuna abro:ul and export it to 
the United States. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, No. C-88-1380 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1992). 
108. GAIT, Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna 1111 5.11-.15, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Mexican Tuna case]. 
109. See supra note 99. 
110. Mexican Tuna case, supra note 108, 1I1I 5.24-.26 & 5.31-32. 
111. Id. 1111 5.27-28 & 5.33. The panel concluded that the Dolphin Protection Consumer 
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postponed presentation to the GATT Council of the panel opinion. 112 
The result in this case has significant implications for national envi-
ronmental measures that affect international trade taken by individual 
states or groups of states,113 and particularly those aimed at protect-
ing resources of the global commons. 114 
Infonnation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385, a labelling statute enacted in December 1990 that was also 
challenged by Mexico, did not contravene the GAlT because that legislation applies equally to 
imported products from all countries. Id. mI5.43-44. Likewise, the panel found that the Pelly 
Amendment to the Fishennen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978, which authorizes 
the extension of the MMP A ban to all fish products from the offending nations, was not a 
violation of the GAlT because of that statute's discretionary character, which discretion had 
not been exercised in the case before the panel. Id. ~~ 5.20-21. 
112. See Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1991, at A26 (advertisement by Government of Mexico). See 
also Auerbach, supra note 97. The GAlT Council recently rejected a request by the EC to 
adopt the Mexican Tuna panel report. See GAlT Council Refuses EC Request to Adopt 
Panel Report on U.S. Tuna Embargo, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 353 (1992). 
113. Like the Mexican Tuna case, none of the three other dispute settlement panels that 
have interpreted the exemptions in Article XX, paragraphs b and g, concerning health and 
natural resources have concluded that those provisions justify challenged trade measures. See 
GAlT, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, BISD, 
supra note 21, at 200 (37th Supp. 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991) (import 
restrictions not justified by Article XX(b) in light of disparate treatment of domestic and 
imported products); GAlT, Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring 
and Salmon, BISD, supra note 21, at 98 (35th Supp. 1989) (export restrictions that 
discriminate with respect to foreign markets not primarily aimed at conservation and therefore 
not justified by Article XX(g»; GAlT, United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and 
Tuna Products from Canada, BISD, supra note 21, at 91 (29th Supp. 1983) (import 
restrictions not justified by Article XX(g) in light of disparate treatment of domestic 
production and consumption). See also United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, In the 
Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Panel No. 
CDA-89-1807-01 (Oct. 16, 1989) (LEXIS, Intlaw library, USCFTA file) (requirement that fish 
caught in Canadian waters be "landed" in Canada under Article XX(g), incorporated by 
reference into article 1201 of United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, 27 I.L.M. 281 
(1988), not justified in light of available less burdensome alternatives as judged by whether 
measure would have been adopted if all its costs fell on Canadian nationals); EEC Commission 
v. Denmark, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4607, [1989] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 619, [1989] 2 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 167 (quantitative retrictions on imported beverages sold in 
containers not approved by Danish government for reuse inconsistent with Treaty Establishing 
European Economic Community, 98 U.N.T.S. 11). Cf. GAlT, United States-Taxes on 
Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, BISD, supra note 21, at 136 (34th Supp. 1988), 
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1596 (1988) (analyzing tax on imported chemicals under 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-75, without examining environmental objectives of statute). See generally Chamovitz, 
supra note 97. 
114. Besides the MMPA, supra note 105, the ruling in the Mexican Tuna case could affect 
the validity under international law of a number of United States statutes, including the 
Packwood and Pelly Amendments, supra notes 61 & 62, at issue in Japan Whaling; the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (prohibiting trade in endangered species); the African 
Elephant Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.§ 420 (prohibiting ivory imports from countries with 
inadequate elephant conservation programs); and regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 82, promulgated 
under the Clean Air Act §§ 601-618,42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q (restricting imports and exports 
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In contrast to the opportunities for public input into the legislative, 
administrative, and judicial fora in which this dispute was treated on 
the domestic level, but consistent with standard GATT procedures, liS 
the documents and oral proceedings in the case were not accessible to 
the public. Dispute settlement in GATT does not allow for participa-
tion by private parties as intervenors or amici. 1l6 However, in the 
Mexican Tuna case, ten other GATT parties and the European Ec0-
nomic Community made written submissions to the panel,117 all of 
which were critical of the MMP A ban and most of which argued that 
that action is inconsistent with the GATT. 
In the mid-1980s EPA, acting on evidence that the fumigant ethy-
lene dibromide (EDB) causes cancer, genetic mutations, and adverse 
reproductive effects in human beings, banned that pesticide for use on 
domestic produce. ll8 By contrast, in response to assertions from the 
Department of State that the ban would damage the economies of 
friendly exporting countries, EPA promulgated a tolerance permitting 
that continued to allow residues of thirty parts per billion (Ppb) of 
EDB in imported mangoes. 119 The District of Columbia Circuit, con-
of ozone-depleting chemicals). cr. supra note 99 (discussing GAIT Working Group on 
Environmental Measures in International Trade with mandate to address trade measures in 
existing environmental agreements, including the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, 
and CITES). 
115. See 1979 Understanding, supra note 103, Annex 11 6(iv) ("Written memoranda 
submitted to the panel have been considered confidential, but are made available to the pmics 
to the dispute."). See also Draft Fmal Act, supra note 22, § S 1i1112.1-2 (draft understanding 
on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes under articles XXII and XXlll 
of the GAIT specifying that ''written memoranda submitted to the panel shlllI be considered 
confidential"). 
116. Cf. Free-Trade Agreement, United States-Canada, Dec. 22 & 23, 1987, and Jan. 2, 
1988, art. 1904, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) (providing that the two governments shlllI initiate 
dispute settlement proceedings in antidumping and countervailing duty ClISCS upon request of 
private litigants, which have the right to appear and be represented by counsel before p3Ile1). 
117. See 1979 Understanding, supra note 103, 11 15 ("Any contracting ~ having a 
substantial interest in the matter before a panel, and having notified this to the Council, should 
have an opportunity to be heard by the panel."). 
118. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act §§ 2, 6(b) & (c), 7 U.S.c. 
§§ 1363, 136d(b) & (c) (registration and cancellation and suspension of registration) 
[hereinafter FIFRA]. 
119. 51 Fed. Reg. 5682 (1986). This interim tolerance, which initially was to have expired 
on September 30, 1986, was subsequently extended through September 30, 1987. 51 Fed. Reg. 
34,369 (1986). EPA had earlier promulgated an interim tolerance that expired on September 
I, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 2547 (1985). From that date until the revived tolerance of February 
1986 took effect, imported mangoes with any residue of EDB were prohibited from entering 
interstate commerce in the United States. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 408 
& 409, 21 U.S.c. §§ 346a & 348 (establishment of pesticide tolerances for agricultuml raw 
commodities and processed foods) [hereinafter FFDCA}. EPA must set tolerances, or 
allowable residue limits, at the same time it registers a pesticide under FIFRA § 2, 7 U.S.c. 
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cluding that EPA's reliance solely on concerns of foreign affairs in the 
establishment of a pesticide residue limitation was arbitrary and 
capricious, granted a petition for review and set aside the mango tol-
erance. 120 On remand, EPA claimed that the continued tolerance for 
imported mangoes was justified by ongoing cooperative efforts with 
food-exporting nations to assure that fruit and vegetables enter the 
United States free of pests such as the Mediterranean fruitfiy, dis-
eases, and unsafe levels of pesticides. Moreover, mango-producing 
nations were channelling export revenues into the search for alterna-
tives for EDB. Accordingly, EPA concluded that revoking the EDB 
tolerance would pose greater risks to the food supply than continuing 
that requirement. After EPA provided assurances with respect to the 
limited term of the standard for imported mangoes, the court 
approved the tolerance. 121 
Another recent case raises similar questions as to the propriety of 
considering international trade factors in the context of regulatory 
regimes designed to protect health and the environment. In February 
1990, after the development of testing methods that could detect them 
for the first time, residues of the fungicide N-(3,5-dichlorophenyl)-1,2-
dimethylcyclopropane-l,2-dicarboximide, marketed under the trade 
name "procymidone," were discovered on wines imported from 
Europe. Procymidone, manufactured by the Japanese chemical cor-
poration Sumitomo and classified by EPA as a "probable human car-
cinogen," is widely used in wine-producing regions of Europe to 
control the grape disease botrytis. Because that disease is not found 
in America, the pesticide procymidone was neither registered for use 
in the United States nor was a residue limitation established for the 
chemical. 122 Accordingly, products containing any residues of pro-
cymidone were prohibited from entering interstate commerce in the 
United States. Because of the potentially serious and unprecedented 
trade disruption, 123 EPA expedited the tolerance-setting proceeding 
§ 136a. See generally National Research Council, Regulating Pesticides in Food: The 
Delaney Paradox 27 (1987) [hereinafter National Research Council]. Pursuant to procedures 
in the FFDCA, EPA publishes a proposed tolerance in the Federal Register, invites public 
comments on the proposal, and publishes a notice announcing a final tolerance that responds 
to the comments. See FFDCA §§ 408(d),(e) & 409(b),(c),(d), 21 U.S.C. §§ 346a(d),(e) & 
348(b),(c),(d); National Research Council, supra, at 27. cr. APA § 4,5 U.S.C. § 553 (notice-
and-comment rulemaking). 
120. Nat'l Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875, 883 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
121. Nat'l Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 815 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
122. See supra note 119 (pesticide registration and tolerance-setting). 
123. The United States imports approximately $1 billion worth of wine per year, with BC 
HeinOnline -- 32 Va. J. Int’l L. 411 1991-1992
1992] INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 411 
and relied on less extensive data than it ordinarily would. Although 
EPA asserted that the tolerance it set was fully protective of public 
health, "EPA. . . candidly acknowledged that the potential trade 
implications posed by the procymidone situation were considered by 
EPA in evaluating Sumitomo's petition. EPA took into account 
potential impacts on both foreign and U.S. economies and the public 
health of U.S. consumers."124 
Relying on the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA),I25 EPA in 
July 1989 published a final rule banning the manufacture, importa-
tion, processing, and distribution in commerce of most asbestos-con-
mining products.126 The regulation was subsequently successfully 
challenged on domestic statutory grounds. 127 A Canadian mining 
company and a number of Canadian trade unions were among the 
petitioners contesting the validity of the regulation.128 The Govem-
nations that use procymidone on wine grapes accounting for over 95% of this value. See 55 
Fed. Reg. 39,171 (1990) (proposed Sept. 25, 1990) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
concerning tolerance for procymidone citing "overwhelming trade issues"). 
124. 56 Fed. Reg. 19,518, 19,519 (1991) (final rule establishing tolerance for procymidone 
on wine grapes). At an earlier stage of the proceeding, EPA warned that it would 
have to take into consideration whether international reaction to import detentions 
potentially could result in other trade disruptions which have wider im~cts on the 
adequacy and aifordability of the food supply. EPA will also have to consider 
whether the United States foreign policy efforts to obtain complinnce by other 
countries with [United States statutory] requirements applicable to foods imported to 
the United States will be undermined if EPA fails to take extraordinary action in this 
instance. 
55 Fed. Reg. at 39,177 (1990) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking). Moreover, notwith· 
standing an acknowledgnIent that the standards of the Codex Alimentarius are less protective 
of public health than EPA's, EPA proposed to rely "in appropriate circumstances" on 1lllIJd-
mum residue limitations established in the Codex Alimentarius on an interim b:Isis until a final 
tolerance was established. Id. at 39,178. See supra note 102 (discussing Codex). 
125. TSCA § 6, 25 U.S.C. § 2605. 
126. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460 (1989). According to that notice, 
[i]t is well-recognized that asbestos is a human carcinogen and is one of the most 
hazardous substances to which humans are exposed in both occupational and non-
occupational settings. As OSHA [the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration] stated ... , "OSHA is aware of no instance in which exposure to a 
toxic substance has more clearly demonstrated detrimental health effects on humans 
than has asbestos exposure." There is wide agreement that all types of asbestos fibers 
are associated with pulmonary fibrosis (asbestosis), lung cancer, and mesothelioma. 
Gastrointestinal cancer and other cancers at extrathoracic sites, as well as other lung 
disorders and diseases, have also been associated with asbestos exposure, although 
the consistency and magnitude of the excess risks of these diseases are not as great as 
for lung cancer and mesothelioma. All of these asbestos·related diseases are life-
threatening or disabling and cause substantial pain and suffering. 
Id. at 29,468-69. 
127. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
See TSCA § 19, 15 U.S.c. § 2618 (judicial review). 
128. 947 F.2d at 1208 n.3. 
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ment of Canada took the further extraordinary step of filing an ami-
cus brief129 in this proceeding asserting that, because it was not 
supported by sufficient scientific evidence, the EPA rule was an 
import prohibition in violation of the GAIT130 and the United States-
Canada Free-Trade Agreement131 and an unnecessary obstacle to 
trade within the meaning of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade concluded during the Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations in 
GAIT.132 Although Canada's brief did not address the question of 
remedy as a domestic legal matter, that document strongly implied 
that the asserted violation of international law was relevant to, if not 
dispositive of, the regulation's validity under TSCA's statutory 
scheme. 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Canadian private party peti-
tioners lacked standing because of the statute's primarily domestic 
focus. 133 To the extent that the Government of Canada relied on 
arguments raised by those petitioners or identified new issues, the 
court disregarded the Canadian Government's brief. 134 The court fur-
ther noted that the GAIT and the United States-Canada Free-Trade 
Agreement were alternative fora for resolving trade disputes arising 
out of obligations in international agreements. 135 However, the fact 
that Canada would itself raise the legal implications of an interna-
tional trade agreement in a domestic legal dispute in a United States 
court, together with the Fifth Circuit's equivocal resolution of the 
issue, suggests that similar arguments will be asserted in the future. 
IV. STRENGTHENING THE NEXUS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL 
AND DOMESTIC LAW 
This uneasy interface between international and national law has 
potentially far-reaching, but as yet largely unappreciated, implica-
tions. Consider an example that illustrates some possible ramifica-
129. Brief for Amicus Curiae Government of Canada at 16-19, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. 
Envtl. Protection Agency, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). The Province of Quebec also 
submitted an amicus brief. See 947 F.2d at 1208. Canada did not initiate a dispute settlement 
proceeding under the GATI' or the Free Trade Agreement. See supra notes 97 & 103 
(describing GATI' dispute settlement mechanism). 
130. GATI', supra note 98, art. XI(I). 
131. Free Trade Agreement, United States-Canada, Dec. 22 & 23, 1987 & Jan. 2, 1988, I1rt. 
603, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988). 
132. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, art. 2(1), 31 U.S.T. 405, 
T.I.A.S. No. 9616, reprinted in BISD, supra note 21, at 8 (26th Supp. 1980). 
133. 947 F.2d at 1209-11. 
134. Id. at 1208. 
135. Id. at 1211 n. 8. 
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tions. Assume that the contracting parties to the GA'IT have 
accepted the current text on sanitary and phytosanitary standards 
from the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations.136 Assume further 
that, in response to new scientific evidence of the high risk of cancer 
associated with this product, the pesticide Zap-Em is removed from 
the market pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FlFRA).137 EPA cancels Zap-Em's registration138 
and bans its residues on domestic and imported foodstuffs by revoking 
the existing tolerance for the product. 139 Ruritania, also a party to 
the GATT, initiates a dispute settlement proceeding in that body, 
alleging that the prohibition on residues of Zap-Em in Ruritanian 
food exported to the United States is stricter than relevant interna-
tional standards and, to the extent the ban is more stringent than 
those requirements, is scientifically unjustified and, therefore, a viola-
tion of the GATT. A panel established in accordance with the 
GATT's dispute settlement provisions finds that EPA's ban on Zap-
Em constitutes a non-tariff barrier to trade in violation of that 
agreement. 140 
The Executive Branch is now presented with the unfortunate 
choice between lifting the ban or continuing to violate international 
law. If the former is chosen, the resulting tolerance-setting proceed-
ing could raise unique questions because of its unusual impact on for-
eign policy. In a subsequent lawsuit challenging the new tolerance, 141 
the Executive Branch might assert application of the political ques-
tion doctrine, as it does in many cases touching on foreign affairs, to 
preclude judicial review.142 Even if the case were held to be justicia-
ble, the foreign affairs context of the rulemaking might counsel partic-
ular deference to the Executive Branch. 143 
Solely due to the foreign affairs context of the later rulemaking, the 
procedural guarantees accompanying this second tolerance-setting 
136. See supra note 10l. 
137. See supra note 118. §§ 136-136y. 
138. See supra note 118. § 136d(b). 
139. FFDCA §§ 408 & 409. 21 U.S.c. §§ 346a & 348 (establishment of pesticide tolerances 
for agricultural raw commodities and processed foods). 
140. See supra notes 97 & 103. 
141. FFDCA §§ 4080) & 409(g). 21 U.S.c. §§ 3463(i) & 348(g) (petitions for review). The 
statute also provides for agency-level proceedings in the form of formal objections to a final 
tolerance and a subsequent administrative hearing. FFDCA §§ 408(d)(S) & 409(0. 21 U.S.c. 
§§ 346a(d)(5) & 348(0; National Research Council. supra note 119. at 27-29. cr. AP A § 10. S 
U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (judicial review). 
142. See supra note 55. 
143. See supra notes 42 & 56 and accompanying text. 
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proceeding are entirely different from the process that established the 
tolerance for Zap-Em in effect before the ban. Although perhaps a 
particularly virulent example, this hypothetical scenario illustrates the 
profound discontinuities that can arise when issues ordinarily gov-
erned by domestic statutory structures emerge in an international 
context. At least two initiatives would tend to minimize these diver-
gences between the international and national legal systems while pre-
serving the integrity of the international obligations of the United 
States: (1) encouraging greater Congressional participation in inter-
national agreements not expressly authorized by statute; and (2) regu-
larizing public participation in international regulatory processes at 
the national and international levels. 
A. Congressional Participation in International Agreements Not 
Expressly Contemplated by Statute 
The Japan Whaling and Greenpeace cases demonstrate the disrup-
tive effect international agreements can have on domestic legislative 
regimes. Existing statutory and regulatory schemes can mesh 
smoothly with treaties and executive agreements authorized by the 
Congress through legislative participation in defining the terms of 
those international instruments. Moreover, Congressionally-sanc-
tioned international agreements have the imprimatur of the legislative 
branch as the law of the land. By contrast, executive agreements not 
expressly contemplated by statute, even if not strictly inconsistent 
with existing law,l44 can nonetheless modify or even frustrate the 
operation of existing legislation and regulation without the participa-
tion of the legislative branch. 
That an "agreement can be given effect without the enactment of 
subsequent legislation by the Congress," as set out in State Depart-
ment policy,145 is not by itself necessarily sufficient evidence of consis-
tency with Congressional intent as expressed in an existing legislative 
scheme. Nor does that test provide adequate legal justification as a 
matter of course in the absence of express prior statutory authoriza-
144. Cf. Restatement, supra note 10, § 115 reporters' note 5 (sole executive agreement 
inconsistent with state or federal law). See also Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 3(a), 19 
U.S.C. § 2504(a) (specifying that "[n]o provision of any trade agreement approved by 
Congress ... , nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which 
is in conflict with any statute of the United States shall be given effect under the laws of the 
United States"); United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988 
§ 102(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note (same); United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation 
Act of 1985, § 5, 19 U.S.c. § 2112 note (same). 
145. See supra note 51. 
HeinOnline -- 32 Va. J. Int’l L. 415 1991-1992
1992] INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 415 
tion for the choice of an executive agreement instead of either an arti-
cle II, section 2 treaty or a Congressional-Executive mechanism 
requiring the participation of the legislature. The mere existence of 
statutory authority in a particular area does not consequently imply 
that an executive agreement that has domestic legal effect and that 
purports to rely on that authority is consistent with the underlying 
Congressional purpose. Further, reliance on an executive agreement 
not expressly contemplated by statute could be questionable when 
implementation is intended to be accomplished by new regulations or 
rulemakings pursuant to existing statutes. In such a case, the interna-
tional agreement could compromise the regulatory process, thereby 
undermining important principles of administrative law like those in 
the AP A. Finally, even when both statutory and regulatory authori-
ties are in place, the choice of an executive agreement would be inap-
propriate because of its tendency through international processes to 
constrain future legislative and administrative choices. 
However, as State Department policy also recognizes,l46 resolution 
of the historically delicate question of "choice of instrument" is quite 
sensitive to context. In such situations, silence, indifference, or acqui-
escence by the Congress can carry legal significance. 147 To overcome 
potentially difficult questions concerning the necessary threshold level 
of Congressional interest and thorny interbranch disputes that can 
arise on a case-by-case basis,148 Congress ought to consider enacting 
legislation that would articulate the requisite legislative concern for 
each executive agreement not previously authorized by statute that 
falls within the enumerated powers of the Congress and that is 
intended to have domestic legal effect. Legislative participation in 
formulating and giving domestic legal effect to international agree-
ments within realms of statutory concern will almost by definition 
146. lei. 
147. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 663, 669 (1981) (describing "only 
one more episode in the never-ending tension between the President exercising the executive 
authority in a world that presents each day some new challenge with which he must deal and 
the Constitution, under which we all live and which no one disputes embodies some sort of 
system of checks and balances" and noting that "when the President acts in the absence of 
congressional authorization he may enter 'a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may 
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain' to) (quoting Jackson, J. 
concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952». 
148. See, e.g., Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Memorandum of Law on Choice of 
Instruments for Sinai Accords, reprinted in 1 Glennon & Franck, supra note 34, at 273 
(arguing that portions of executive agreements concluded by President \\ith Israel should be 
treated as article II, section 2 treaties). See generally Arthur W. Rovine, SCp3l'lltion of Powers 
and International Executive Agreements, 52 Ind. W. 397 (1977); Treaties and Executive 
Agreements,71 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'} L. 235 (1978). 
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tend to assure greater consistency with overall statutory purposes. 
For instance, the legislation might require the Executive Branch to 
transmit interim drafts of this sub-category of executive agreements to 
relevant Congressional committees and establish a process for regu-
larized consultation with those committees. 149 The Congress could 
also enact legislation with instructions to the judiciary that executive 
agreements on matters within the enumerated powers of Congress 
must be explicitly authorized by statute to have effect as domestic 
law. 150 Alternatively, the Executive could itself decide to alter its 
practice in this with respect to this sub-category of executive 
agreements. 
For this same sub-category of agreements, there should also be an 
explicit instruction to the courts to decide questions of statutory inter-
pretation notwithstanding the political question doctrine and foreign 
affairs implications. lSI Further, the legislation should address the 
current overly broad discretion of the courts, short of a conclusion of 
non justiciability through application of the political question doc-
trine, haphazardly to take broad account of foreign relations concerns 
in judicial decisions with few apparent standards. Instead, Congress 
ought to substitute principles governing the judicial calculus to clarify 
the legal force of an Executive Branch action taken in an international 
context, within the enumerated powers of Congress, intended to have 
149. cr. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1102(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2902 (d) 
(consultations with Congress before conclusion of trade agreements); Trade Act of 1974 
§ 102(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2112(c) (same). 
150. By enacting subsequent legislation that supersedes as a matter of domestic law an 
earlier executive agreement on subject matter within its enumerated powers, Congress can go 
considerably farther than this proposal. See Restatement, supra note 10, § 115(1)(a). Of 
course, this situation is distinct from a "sole" executive agreement concluded entirely within 
the President's plenary powers connected with foreign relations, such as the recognition of 
foreign governments. See supra note 50. Despite some superficial similarities, this suggestion 
is entirely distinct from the so-called "Bricker Amendment" dispute in the early 1950s. See 
generally Duane Tananbaum, The Bricker Amendment Controversy: A Test of Eisenhower's 
Political Leadership (1988). Senator Bricker proposed a constitutional amendment, and the 
various forms of the Bricker Amendment generally applied to all international agreements, 
including article II, section 2 treaties. This suggestion, by contrast, calls for a statute that 
would regulate the domestic legal effect of only those executive agreements falling within the 
realm of the Congress's constitutionally enumerated powers. Those executive agreements 
purely within the President's exclusive plenary powers concerning foreign relations, lind in 
particular "sole" executive agreements on matters like the recognition of foreign governments, 
would not be covered. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (domestic legal 
effect of executive agreement recognizing government of Soviet Union); United States v. 
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (same). 
151. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (declining to 
apply political question doctrine to questions of statutory interpretation involving foreign 
relations concerns). 
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domestic legal effect, and not expressly authorized or participated in 
by the Congress. 152 
B. Regularized Public Participation on the National and 
International Levels 
Perhaps the most obvious divergences between international and 
national law involve considerations of process. For example, if the 
Uruguay Round proposals on harmonization of sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards are adopted, GAIT dispute settlement 
mechanisms will become a forum in which United States regulations 
on pesticide residues could be challenged as a matter of international 
law. However, unlike domestic legislative, administrative, and judi-
cial processes, those mechanisms are secret and inaccessible to the 
public.153 In the Mexican Tuna case the Executive Branch-in secret 
and with no formal opportunity for Congressional or public input-
was responsible for vigorously defending a policy it reluctantly 
adopted only after flouting three statutory directives and resisting a 
court order. lS4 Such "cognitive dissonance" may be an endemic arti-
fact of our domestic constitutional structure of separation of powers, 
in which the President both carries out the law and serves as the "sole 
organ of the nation in its external relations."lss The posture of the 
Mexican Tuna case and the Uruguay Round, which would give for-
eign governments the authority to challenge United States pesticide 
residue limitations, nevertheless throws the closed nature of GAIT 
dispute settlement into sharp relief and pointedly demonstrates the 
failure of that procedure to insure even a modicum of accountability 
to the public. 
As more environmental threats that are governed by or overlap 
with domestic regulatory structures are addressed in the international 
arena, there is a commensurately increasing need for improved 
processes for public participation on the international level. To ame-
152. FOIA, by prescribing standards for Executive Branch action arguably within the 
President's own plenary powers, goes considerably farther than this proposal. The stlltute 
authorizes withholding documents that are specifically authorized to be classified pursuant to 
executive order and are "in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." S 
U.S.C. § 552b(e)(I)(B). Executive orders establishing the classification system, the asserted 
legal authority for which are the President's own constitutional powers, predate FOIA. The 
legislation is nevertheless a constitutional exercise of legislative power, and the courts will 
order the release of information improperly classified. See, e.g., Donovan v. Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, 806 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1986); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187 (D.c. Cir. 1978). 
153. See supra notes 115 & 116 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra notes 106 & 107. 
155. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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liorate the effects of resulting discontinuities, multilateral fora like 
GAIT might adopt rules of procedure that regularize and greatly 
expand public access to, and public accountability of, their law-mak-
ing, law-enforcing, and adjudicatory processes. Without question, 
improved access and public participation at the international level is 
the most desirable way to reconcile these disparities, while simultane-
ously furthering the larger public policy goals of improving the legiti-
macy and accountability of the international legal system. IS6 
However, much can also be done at the purely national level in the 
absence of progress on the international level or until multilaterally 
agreed-upon measures are implemented. 
First, the APA's foreign affairs exceptionlS7 should be reevaluated. 
The underlying justification for that provision is no longer warranted, 
if it ever was. The foreign affairs exception is a crude and unsophisti-
cated mechanism governing a sphere of the law that has become 
increasingly nuanced and complex. Environment, like foreign trade, 
clearly falls within the enumerated powers of the Congress. The 
national legislature has reacted to both issues with complex webs of 
statutory and regulatory directives. For that reason, both areas are 
fundamentally different from traditional security and foreign affairs 
concerns like the conduct of war and the recognition of foreign gov-
ernments entrusted by the Constitution to the President. ISS Likewise, 
international undertakings on both environmental and foreign trade 
matters governed by statute are well within the reach of Congres-
sionallaw-making authority. Accordingly, the unusual deference to 
the Executive Branch contained in the AP A exception merely because 
of the international context for decision-making is not warranted. 
156. See, e.g., Sands, supra note 18 (arguing for creation and regularization of mechanisms 
for public participation international law-making and -enforcement): David A. Wirth, 
Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Model for Advocacy on Third World 
Environmental Issues, 100 Yale L.J. 2645 (1991) (same). 
157. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. The Administrative Conference of the 
United States has recommended eliminating the foreign affairs exception and replacing it with 
narrower exemptions. 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-5. See also Arthur Earl Bonfield, Military and 
Foreign Affairs Function Rule-Making Under the APA, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 221 (1972) 
(adVocating repeal of exception); Franck, Public Participation in the Foreign Policy Process, in 
The Constitution and the Conduct of Foreign Policy 66, 75 (p. Wilcox & R. Frank ed. 1976) 
("Total exemption of foreign affairs functions from administrative process is not justified. 
Many aspects of these functions are analogous to domestic issues now subject to process; the 
fact that they take on an international dimension does not necessarily or even probably mean 
that all forms of administrative process should be excluded."); Araiza, supra note 54 
(advocating statutorily mandated notice-and-comment rulemaking in international trade 
context). 
158. But cf. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Redefining Security, Foreign Afr., Spring 1989, at 
162 (identifying environment as security concern). 
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Second, Congress should replace the sweeping AP A exemption 
with comprehensive new legislation that articulates how basic princi-
ples of American public law will be applied in a foreign affairs con-
text. At a minimum, this legislation should establish standards for 
distinguishing between those domains-such as war and recognition 
of foreign governments-that are appropriate for an exemption like 
that currently in the AP A and those-like environment-that are 
not. For the latter category, outcome-neutral procedures analogous 
to notice-and-comment rulemaking1S9 and judicial reviewl60 under the 
AP A should be established, with processes tailored to meet the needs 
of governmental decision-making in national, bilateral, and multilat-
eral contexts. For instance, the legislation might require pUblication 
of interim drafts of international agreements in the Federal Register, 
with a subsequent opportunity for formal public comment to United 
States negotiators, unless the President provides compelling reasons, 
such as overriding national security concerns, to justify a waiver. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Employing international processes to address international environ-
mental risks is obviously sensible, desirable, and in some cases neces-
sary. Improving the efficacy and accountability of multilateral 
mechanisms to make them responsive to serious global threats, like 
stratospheric ozone depletion and greenhouse warming, should be a 
top priority from both legal and policy perspectives. At least for now, 
however, there is also a risk that critical principles of separation of 
powers, public participation, and democratic decision-making will be 
compromised merely because an environmental issue has been 
removed to an international forum. These fundamentals, which are 
essential to the integrity of our governmental structure, are by no 
means confined to environmental law. Although the international 
environment is probably the best example of the discontinuities 
between international and domestic law, virtually any area of Con-
gressional power and action can engage these crucial questions. 
International initiatives can be effective, efficient, and in some cases 
indispensable vehicles for furthering environmental and other 
national and international goals. But that is not a sufficient justifica-
tion for subverting our democratic principles and fundamental gov-
ernmental structure by shielding unilateral, often secret action by the 
Executive Branch (where only one official, the President, is directly 
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accountable to the public) from Congressional, public, and judicial 
review. Legal processes for otherwise desirable international environ-
mental undertakings should be altered to ensure that Executive 
Branch activities on the international level are accountable to the 
Congress and to the public at large, as measured against the same 
basic principles that apply to legislative or administrative actions. 
Through its own inattention, by Executive Branch design, or both, 
the Congress has been marginalized in the negotiation and implemen-
tation of many international environmental agreements. Areas within 
the enumerated powers of Congress, of which environment is clearly 
one, should not be usurped by the Executive Branch merely because 
they arise in an international context. Those matters, like environ-
ment, governed by domestic statutes are clearly distinguishable from 
those within the Executive's plenary powers. Our constitutional sys-
tem of separation of powers anticipates and can accommodate a larger 
role for the legislature in the category of international concerns that 
simultaneously fall within the plenary powers of the Congress. More-
over, greater involvement of the legislature will tend to produce sig-
nificant incidental benefits. As a legal and practical matter, greater 
opportunities for Congressional input will ameliorate or eliminate dis-
continuities between the international and domestic legal systems. 
Over time, a higher level of legislative participation might even 
encourage greater public accountability of international processes 
generally. 
